The Social Architecture of Integrity: Corruption Proofing of Legislation as a Socio-Legal Reform Capable of Building Public Trust

Abstract

In democratic systems, public trust is increasingly undermined when law-making is perceived as susceptible to undue influence from corrupt or criminal actors. This paper explores Corruption proofing of legislation (CPL) as more than a procedural tool, conceptualising it as a socio-legal reform with implications for institutional legitimacy and public trust. Drawing on institutional theory, the study applies a qualitative comparative policy analysis of CPL designs in Moldova, Lithuania, and Albania. The findings identify two contrasting institutional approaches: an external model relying on independent oversight bodies (Moldova and Lithuania) and an internal model embedded within parliamentary procedures (Albania). While both seek to reduce corruption risks in legislation, the analysis demonstrates that institutional design plays a decisive role in fostering public trust. Independent CPL mechanisms appear better positioned to enhance trust by ensuring impartial scrutiny and reinforcing transparency and accountability. Ultimately, the paper argues that CPL’s broader societal significance lies in its ability to reshape formal rules and informal normal of law-making, strengthening democratic resilience against state capture.