

The Creation of NATO and the Western Alliance

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Abstract

Stalin's actions in eastern Europe evoked fear and uncertainty in the West. The Red Army's fear of a Soviet invasion of the free part of the continent continued to be a major nightmare for post-war Europe. The coup d'état in Czechoslovakia had the same effect as Stalin's military intervention in Poland. Stalin had ordered to intervene against a country that had great international sympathy for resistance to Hitler in the late 1930s. Whatever Stalin's goal was, he was completely unjustified. The Western Europeans were very afraid. If the Communists did not find it difficult to organize a coup in Prague, what would stop them from doing so in Rome or Paris? And if they tried to do something like that, who would stop them?

Keywords: East, Europe, West, Alliance, Reaction, NATO

Introduction

Establishing a Western alliance against Soviet military danger

British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin had the great idea to establish a new military alliance that would strongly link Western Europe and the United States. Even French minister Bido agreed half-jokingly saying that he no longer wished to be at the top of a secret resistance in the event of an aggressor invading his country. France and Britain agreed to establish a new military alliance with the aim of appeasing European public opinion and showing that communism could not march as it pleased on this part of the continent. As they could not do without the United States of America, Washington was invited to participate.

British Foreign Minister Bevin argued that the survival of the West depended on the strong alliance with the United States of America with Great Britain and British dominance. With the Prague coup, he told Marshall not to lose time, but to create an alliance between the US and Western Europe. Seeing Marshall's reluctance, Bevin invited in 1948 the foreign ministers of Benelux and France to join a Western European military pact. Seeing the Soviet advance in central Europe, the US Senate voted for the Vandenberg Resolution, which urged President Truman to progressively pursue regional development for self-defense.

2. Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance

The process of treaty creation to include the North Atlantic countries began to expand even further. Talks on such an alliance began in 1948 with the participation of Britain, France, the US, Canada and the Benelux countries. At the meeting of September 9, 1948, they agreed that it was necessary to create a military alliance to restore European confidence.

In order to have a much broader scope, representatives of Italy, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Portugal were also invited to the talks. All these states, on April 4, 1949, signed in Washington the treaty, establishing the North Atlantic Alliance. (NATO).

Like any alliance, NATO had its problems from the beginning. France insisted that the alliance equally determined to act against Germany as it did against the Soviet Union if it would endanger peace and stability. But it was soon realized that without Germany we could not walk. France and Italy were paralyzed by the strength of the respective Communist parties. The defense of Germany entered in the orbit of geostrategic interests of the time.

The most difficult test of the North Atlantic Alliance's defense system was NATO itself. This alliance is a union of values of a common history and culture. Of all the alliances that history has known this is the most powerful alliance. Western

Europe accounted for nearly half of US investment in the world. In the broad sense of the word, the ability of Western allies is shown to successfully cope with possible aggression. Here's why, at this very point even the biggest mistakes have been made that have in many cases led to deep crises within NATO.

In the Cold War years it was said that Americans had to keep up with Western Europe because it had the largest US bases there and it was necessary to have them there. In fact it is quite the opposite. It was Europe that had to keep up with America because American investments in every area of life made it possible to protect and operate half of the continent as a democracy. The United States of America had and has a strategic interest in Europe related to the possibility of American interests spreading into Euro-Asia.

With the change of geostrategic realities the survival of security is no longer in Europe, but it has shifted to Asia where all the Western Alliance's efforts are focused on power changes and above all one tyranny is not replaced by another. If Euro-Asia were ruled by a hostile force or a group of extremists, the threat to world peace and security would be constant. The key to controlling Euro-Asia is undoubtedly Western Europe, in close contact with US.

If the alliance between the US and Europe would break up, it would bring about a severe collapse of Euro-Atlantic values and lead to the loss of the Middle East and above all to violent overthrow in Africa. If all this were to happen, the states that would benefit most would be the Soviet Union and China. From a military point of view, this was unlikely to happen. It should not be forgotten that sometime in 1941, Germany almost did not sink Soviet Russia, and in 1954 a German-American alliance made Russian aggression impossible even when the latter was called the Soviet Union. The industrial resources possessed by Western Hemisphere countries are powerful. The Soviet Union was much in need for Europe's money, but without the opportunity to have the continent as its own property. This is because American troops did not leave Europe. The end of World War II did not bring Americans withdrawal from the old continent, on the contrary, it brought the growth of US investments in western Europe. The establishment of NATO also brought the first difficulties in American-European relations. That's because the Europeans headed by the French were faced with the dilemma offered by American strategic doctrines. Without a clear concept of the nature of the coming war and how to deal with it, even an alliance formed on the basis of the most honorable principles would lose out in finding an understanding of why it should exist.

In the absence of a comprehensive strategy for all partners, the announcement of a formally alliance, found no support. Even after its creation, NATO found it difficult to explain the nature of the protection that would provide to its allies. Whenever a war happens, a state initially decides to always resist as the degree of destruction will be very large. In the atomic age, the rate of destruction is at an unimaginable level.

Since its creation by the US, NATO has had many problems. The primary problem came after the Americans initially refused to share the secret of the nuclear bomb with their European allies. On the other hand, even the European allies were not willing to make the economic sacrifices necessary to have meaningful protection. Some of them even went so far as they preferred to detach from reality by denying the existence of danger. As long as the doctrine of the United States identified Europe's defense with the general war, the contribution of the Allies had to be inclusive. But the western European states did not have the resources to do a total war and their territorial proximity to the Soviet Union made these states even more vulnerable. So, their support for the United States seems to be non-existent. The country that understood the US strategic and leadership position better than anyone else was undoubtedly the UK. That is why America's help in defending Europe during the Cold War was indispensable. But if the United States was responsible for many inconsistencies in NATO policies with the exception of Britain, other European countries did not help overcome these difficulties as they were very eager to recover from the wounds of war and this was used as an excuse to avoid responsibilities.

However, NATO was and remains the key to the effectiveness of an effective alliance in the early days and during the nuclear era. If it were possible to devise an all-encompassing concept of protection for all partners, then the world would have spared all technological horrors. If NATO insisted on maintaining a doctrine with strategic differences between the partners then it would turn into a worthless alliance and all its efforts for world stability would be a waste. As a political organization, it could have validity, but as a military group would be ineffective. In any crisis that may occur, the risk of a gun blast especially in Asia would not save Europe from "pollution". Over time, the impression of powerlessness on European allies would lead to neutrality rather than action. In order to give an assessment to NATO at the beginning of

the Cold War, it would be more appropriate to analyze the defense policies of the member states and above all of America's most powerful partners, Great Britain, West Germany and France.

Everyone in these countries had a personal dilemma regarding the nuclear age. UK was considering to apply a policy of restraint based on reprisals that were similar to the American idea. Germany intended to focus only on the complexity of a local defense. France intended to draw a line between nuclear technology and conventional technology. At a time when European states were divided with these dilemmas, communism threw to the West, the next challenge, in Asia.

3. The creation of Western Europe by Monnet, Schumann and Adenauer

The prospect of a German rearmament would certainly not be seen in France. French citizens had suffered greatly from armed Germany since the year 1870. French public opinion would not accept the fact that they would have to do it again with a capable state to militarily intervene in France for the fourth time in 80 years. In the early 1950s, France did not have a clear policy on how to deal with Germany. De Gaulle was the only French politician to devise two concepts associated with Franco-German relations. The first concept was about the final division of Germany and the second one was about the Franco-German cooperation within Europe. Since the beginning, the foreign Minister Bido had wanted the Germany division, but has rejected by being afraid by the Soviet danger. France was a member of NATO with the conviction that the United States of America and Great Britain would protect it from Germany and the Soviet Union. Despite these measures, France definitely needed a way to coexist with Germany. Jean Monnet gave the most accurate answer to all the French dilemmas. Monnet had lived in the United States for four years as an international economist. There, he had shaped his idea of what France and Europe should be. As early as 1944, he had spoken for the magazine 'Fortune' that US should support a united Europe.

In his idea, France, Great Britain and Germany were the key to this union. In this idea, Monnet has found the "twin soul" in Robert Schumann who saw the Franco-German coexistence as necessary to confront the Anglo-Saxon power. In April 1949, Monnet told Schuman his idea of merging the Franco-German coal and steel industry.

This union would make the war between the two countries virtually impossible. This act would also accelerate European integration. Schuman, understanding Monnet's mission, persuaded the French cabinet to accept the proposal without much debate. On May 9, 1950, the proposal was made public. Chancellor Adenauer had two months that had expressed the idea of France joining the FRG, but he wanted to leave the western neighbor with the pleasure of making the idea public. From this moment on, Monnet has drafted the plan for the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). From this moment on, Monnet and Adenauer became lifelong friends. US High Commissioner McCauley had strongly supported the project, even that he had to use little force to persuade the Barons of Ruhr to accept this project. Great Britain through Minister Bevin supported this project but did not participate in it. For Great Britain, the US relations were the main goal.

Finally, France had found its German policy. The treaty was signed on April 18, 1951 and hostile Franco-German relations ended. Instead of the policy of weakened Germany that has existed since the year 1631 (the doctrine of the "Raison d'Etat" - see vol. 1600-1899, GB), France chose the right path, that of cooperation. The battles already belonged to history and a bright future awaited both countries. Obstacles could not be overcome only with a handshake and by signing a treaty.

For most of the French, the Germans posed a permanent danger. They opposed the creation of the German army and the unification of the two Germans. The French prime minister, Rene Pleven, was aware that France alone could not withstand German rearmament. Only through cooperation with the German army they could successfully resist an eventual attack by the Soviet Union. Like Schumann, Pleven thought it better to join Germany than play old games to prevent the inevitable.

Pleven on October 24, 1950, had drafted a plan to include the new German army within the framework of the European defense system. His plan was to create the EDC (European Defense Community) in which the Germans would have their own officers and troops, but no command role. West Germany would not have its own army outside NATO.

Pleven's plan has found the support of French senior military. Aware of their weaknesses, they knew that with an uncontrolled German army they had no chance of winning. The Germans themselves were the fiercest to oppose the creation of the new German army. Their suffering during World War II justified their refusal. The most famous slogan

among the Germans who refused to create an army was 'Ohne Mich' (without me). Chancellor Adenauer tried to persuade his compatriots telling them that armament was needed as only the Germans could defend the country on the Rhine border.

The chancellor made it clear to the Germans and Western allies that Germany would not participate in the EDC as an occupied country. France had taken its security. The British supported Adenauer's arguments. At first, the Americans hesitated, but eventually accepted. Germany was returning to the families of civilized nations in record time.

4. Conclusions

One year after the signing of the steel and coal treaty, FRG signed on to join EDC. The treaty was signed in Bonn on 25 May 1952 and is known in the history of international relations as the 'Deutschlandvertrag' (German Treaty) because it was the country's first international recognition after the end of World War II. In Exchange to the German recovery, the Allies asked Adenauer for loyalty. The United States and the United Kingdom have made it clear that they want an united FRY with the West. The neutrality of FRY would be unacceptable. could no longer apply Bismarckian "east-west" policy or sign a treaty like that of Rapallo in 1922 that have made German-Soviet relations special.

Adenauer had acted with the leap of time. From 1952, Western allies would view FRY as an indispensable economic, political, and military ally. The integration of the FRY into Western Europe was complete. The other half of the country could not walk into this steps. The irony of the moment was that by wanting to change Korea's map, Kim Il-sung had changed Europe's map for better. East German leader Walter Ulbricht has understood the importance of the situation. Feeling the danger of emptying the country, he ordered the construction of a well-observed line across FRY border. No one could get through it, not even through death. Police-built towers served precisely East German isolation. West Germans were beginning to enjoy the first fruits of freedom and consequently the economic prosperity. Eastern Europeans would go deeper into poverty.

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