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Populism Reloaded?



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Populism, Stigma and Human Rights

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Abstract

From a historical perspective, each century has its own notable events. The first two decades of the 21st century began with high hopes and advancements in technology for society. However, it also inherited many issues and problems from the previous century and has been faced with global events. Human rights and the environment, specifically climate change, remain ongoing concerns. Efforts to address environmental issues have also highlighted societal issues among individuals and between countries, such as the rise of populism. Populist ideologies, politicians, and religious factions have caused divisions among people, groups, nations, and countries. This has led to labelling, stereotyping, discrimination, and loss of status for some, and has stigmatized people and relationships worldwide. Stigma is also used as a tool in the pursuit of power and control over society, as some individuals and groups strive for social status and to prove their superiority. Stigma can change how people understand facts, shape society, and create new social narratives that affect how society is organized, either positively or negatively. Discourses that are negative can weaken social cohesion, increase racial segregation, and lead to social isolation of certain groups. Different ideologies and perspectives can also lead to societal stigma and discrimination against members of specific groups. People or organizations with distinct ideologies or belief systems may incite others in the community to engage in stigmatization, marginalization, discrimination, or even genocide. Throughout history, there have been many examples of these atrocities. It is crucial to promote and foster an atmosphere of understanding, tolerance, and friendship with a focus on human rights among all nations, racial, and religious groups in society. According to human rights principles, all humans are born free and equal in dignity and rights, and it is essential to respect and protect these rights for all individuals. This can be accomplished through education, awareness campaigns, and fostering a culture of acceptance and inclusivity.

Keywords: Populism, Stigma, Society, Culture, Human Rights

Introduction

Throughout history, each century has its own distinctive events. The early years of the 21st century was marked by high expectations and advancements in technology, but also inherited problems from the past century and faced global challenges. The global problems - human rights the environment, and climate- change continue to be major concerns (Ostrom et al. 1999; Gerencser et al. 2008; Wall, 2017). Efforts to tackle environmental problems have brought to light issues within society and among nations, such as the emergence of populism.

Populism, a political ideology that prioritizes the concerns and interests of the common people over those of the elite, has gained significant traction in recent years. As a term populism is characterized by a belief in the sovereignty of the people and a rejection of the established political and economic systems (Müller, 2017). Populists often claim to speak on behalf of the "real" people and to defend the interests of the marginalized against the elites. It is considered by a focus on the needs and concerns of ordinary citizens, and a belief in the power of the people to bring about change (Brubaker, 2017). Populist leaders, ideologies, and religious groups have created division and led to labeling, stereotyping, discrimination, and loss of status for some (Adler-Nissen, 2014). However, populist leaders and movements have been criticized for using stigmatizing language and rhetoric that targets marginalized groups, leading to discrimination and human rights violations.

While populism has been a powerful force throughout history, it has also been met with a great deal of stigma. Critics of populism often argue that it is demagogic and anti-intellectual, and that it can lead to the rise of authoritarian leaders (Updegaff, 2005; Jones, 2019). So, stigma is also used to attain power and control over society, as some individuals and groups strive for dominance and to assert their superiority.

However, it is important to mention that populism is not inherently negative. Populism can be a powerful force for positive change, and many populist movements have played a key role in advancing social and political reforms (Bimber, 1998; Rodrik, 2018). For example, the Civil Rights Movement in the United States was a populist movement that fought for the rights of marginalized communities.

This paper aims to examine the relationship between populism, stigma, and human rights by drawing on research from multiple disciplines, including political science, sociology, psychology, and human rights studies. Firstly, it will be explored by understanding populism the psychological and social factors that contribute to the appeal of populism, the negative effects of stigmatization on marginalized groups, and the role of relative deprivation and social identity threat in support for populism. Secondly, it will be shown some examples by explaining the relations between the populism and stigma, by the explanation how it can lead to discrimination using stigmatizing language and rhetoric. Additionally, the paper will analyze the importance of inclusive policies and programs, the role of civil society organizations

and media in holding populist leaders and movements accountable, and the values and principles of human rights in the face of populist ideologies and stigmatization. The paper concludes by emphasizing the need for an interdisciplinary approach to understanding the relationship between populism, stigma, and human rights.

Understanding Populism through the Psychological and Social Factors

People who are dissatisfied, alienated, and disaffected with the political establishment are frequently drawn to populism and populist leaders, according to a popular understanding. It can manifest in different forms, such as left-wing populism, which advocates for the rights of marginalized groups, or right-wing populism, which focuses on nationalist and anti-immigrant sentiments. In general, populism is a complex political ideology that has been met with both support and opposition (Müller, 2017). While it has the potential to bring about positive change, it is also associated with a range of negative outcomes, including the erosion of civil liberties and democratic institutions, and the rise of extremist politics (Bimber, 1998; Vittori, 2022). It is important to approach the topic of populism with a critical and nuanced perspective, rather than stigmatizing it outright. Populism can also be used as a tool by political actors to gain power by manipulating these psychological and social factors.

Economic Insecurity: People who are struggling financially may be more likely to support populist candidates and movements, as they may see them as offering a solution to their economic problems.

Social Identity: People who feel that their social identity is under threat may be more likely to support populist candidates and movements, as they may see them as offering a sense of belonging and protection.

Sense of Fairness: People who feel that they are not getting a fair deal may be more likely to support populist candidates and movements, as they may see them as offering a more equitable distribution of resources and opportunities.

Lack of Trust in Institution: People who have lost trust in institutions such as government, media, and business may be more likely to support populist candidates and movements, as they may see them as more authentic and trustworthy.

Need for Certainty: People who crave certainty and stability may be more likely to support populist candidates and movements, as they may see them as offering a clear and simple vision for the future.

Fear of Change: People who fear change may be more likely to support populist candidates and movements, as they may see them as offering a return to a simpler and more familiar past.

Emotion-driven Decision making: People who make decisions based on emotions rather than facts and reason may be more likely to support populist candidates and movements, as they may be more appealing to emotions than to reason.

It's important to note that these factors are not mutually exclusive, and that different individuals may be motivated by different combinations of factors. And relative deprivation and social identity threat can play a significant role in support for populism.

Relative deprivation refers to the perception that one's own situation is worse than that of others (Kunst&Obaidi, 2020). When people feel that they are worse off than others, they may be more likely to support populist candidates and movements, as these leaders often present themselves as champions of the "common people" who are fighting against an elite class. It can be said that populist movements often blow into feelings of relative deprivation by highlighting issues such as income inequality, unemployment, and lack of social mobility.

Social identity threat refers to the perception that one's social identity is under threat (Verkuyten et al. (2019). When people feel that their social identity is under threat, they may be more likely to support populist candidates and movements, as these leaders often present themselves as protectors of the "true" nation or group against perceived threats from outsiders. It can be seen that populist movements often tap into feelings of social identity threat by highlighting issues such as immigration, terrorism, and cultural change.

Both relative deprivation and social identity threat can lead to increased support for populist movements. They provide a sense of belonging, recognition, and protection to people who feel marginalized and disenchanting with the status quo (Richter et al. 2020). Populist leaders often use rhetoric that reinforces the idea that the "ordinary people" are being left behind, and that they will take action to correct this injustice (Ditto&Rodriguez, 2021).

It's important to note that these factors alone do not determine support for populism, and other factors such as economic insecurity, lack of trust in institutions, and need for certainty also play a role. Additionally, it's important to consider that populism can also be used as a tool by political actors to gain power by manipulating these psychological and social factors.

Populism and Stigma

Populism can lead to stigma in several ways. One of the most common ways is by stigmatizing language and rhetoric. Populist leaders and movements often use language that scapegoats certain groups, such as immigrants or minorities, and portrays them as a threat to the "real" people (Yilmaz& Morieson, 2021). This can lead to increased prejudice and discrimination towards these groups and can also have negative effects on their human rights. Another way in which populism can lead to

stigma is through the implementation of policies that disproportionately affect marginalized groups (Deakin et al. 2022). For example, a populist leader who campaigns on an anti-immigrant platform may enact policies that restrict immigration, leading to discrimination and marginalization of immigrant communities. Similarly, populist leaders who promote nationalism may enact policies that discriminate against ethnic or religious minorities.

Populism can also lead to stigmatization by creating a hostile political environment where hate speech, xenophobia, and racism become normalized. This can create a society where people feel unsafe, unwelcome, or discriminated against, leading to further division and marginalization.

Additionally, populism can lead to stigma by promote a sense of "otherness" towards certain groups, portraying them as fundamentally different and therefore less deserving of rights and privileges. This can lead to dehumanization, which can then justify discrimination against the targeted groups.

In short, populism can lead to stigma and discrimination by promoting a divisive and hostile political environment, scapegoating marginalized groups, and implementing policies that disproportionately affect these groups (Yilmaz& Morieson, 2021; Deakin et al. 2022).

Stigmatization can have a wide range of negative effects on marginalized groups, including:

Psychological harm: Stigma can lead to feelings of shame, guilt, and self-blame among members of marginalized groups, which can lead to mental health issues such as depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder.

Social isolation: Stigma can lead to social isolation, as members of marginalized groups may feel unwelcome in certain spaces and may be less likely to participate in social activities.

Economic harm: Stigma can lead to economic harm, as members of marginalized groups may face discrimination in the workplace and may be less likely to be hired or promoted.

Reduced access to healthcare: Stigma can lead to reduced access to healthcare, as members of marginalized groups may be less likely to seek medical care out of fear of discrimination or stigmatization.

Human rights violations: Stigma can lead to human rights violations, as members of marginalized groups may be targeted by discriminatory laws and policies and may be denied access to basic rights and services.

Violence and discrimination: Stigma can lead to increased violence and discrimination against marginalized groups, as people may feel more justified in their negative attitudes and discriminatory behavior towards them.

Political marginalization: Stigma can lead to political marginalization, as members of marginalized groups may be less likely to participate in the political process and may be underrepresented in government and political decision-making.

It is important to note that stigmatization can have multiple and compounding effects on marginalized groups, and that it can lead to a wide range of negative consequences for individuals and communities. It is critical to challenge stigmatizing rhetoric and discrimination when it arises, and to promote the values and principles of human rights in the face of populist ideologies.

There are many examples of populist leaders and movements that have used stigmatizing language and rhetoric in recent years. Some examples include:

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the President of Turkey, who has been criticized for using populist rhetoric to divide and marginalize certain groups and communities (Eksi&Wood, 2019; Yilmaz et al. 2021).

Matteo Salvini, the former Deputy Prime Minister of Italy, who has been accused of using xenophobic and racist language against immigrants and minorities (Cervi&Tejedor, 2020).

Viktor Orbán, the Prime Minister of Hungary, who has been criticized for using anti-Semitic and anti-immigrant language in his campaigns (Sadecki, 2022).

Donald Trump, the former President of the United States, who has been accused of using divisive and racist language against immigrants, minorities, and the LGBTQ+ community (Locke, 2022).

Jair Bolsonaro, the President of Brazil, who has been accused of using racist, sexist, and homophobic language in his campaigns and has been criticized for his disregard of Indigenous people and the Amazon rainforest (Elizabeth, 2020).

Vladimir Putin, the President of Russia, who has been accused of using anti-Western language in his campaigns (Eksi&Wood, 2019).

Geert Wilders, the Dutch politician, who has been known for his anti-Islamic rhetoric and his party's anti-immigrant stance (Brubaker, 2017).

Marine Le Pen, the French politician, who has been known for her anti-immigrant stance and her party's rhetoric targeting minorities, particularly the Muslim community (Martins, 2012).

Nigel Farage, the British politician, who has been known for his anti-immigrant stance and his party's rhetoric targeting immigrants and refugees (Durrheim et al. 2018).

These are just a few examples, and there are many other populist leaders and movements that have used stigmatizing language and rhetoric in various countries around the world.

Stigmatization of marginalized groups, such as immigrants, minorities and the LGBTQ+ community (Mitchell et al. 2021), can have a range of negative effects. These effects can include a decrease in self-esteem, feelings of isolation and alienation, a decrease in social capital and access to resources, increased stress and anxiety, and an increased risk of depression. Stigmatization can also lead to discrimination in the workplace or other areas of life and may lead to a lack of access to education or other opportunities. On the other hand, stigma can lead to negative health outcomes, including poorer physical and mental health, as well as reduced access to medical care. So, stigmatization can lead to feelings of hopelessness and despair, which can further exacerbate the already difficult situations marginalized groups often face.

Several negative effects of marginalized individuals' stigma can be explained as follows:

Decreased self-esteem and self-worth: Stigmatization can lead individuals to internalize negative attitudes and beliefs about themselves, leading to decreased self-esteem and self-worth.

Increased stress and anxiety: Stigmatization can create a constant state of stress and anxiety for individuals, leading to physical and mental health problems.

Social exclusion: Stigmatized individuals may experience exclusion from social groups and activities, limiting their opportunities for social support, education, and employment.

Employment discrimination: Stigmatized individuals may face discrimination in the workplace, which can lead to unemployment or under-employment, poverty, and reduced access to healthcare and other essential services.

Intergenerational transmission: Stigmatization can have lasting effects that are passed down from one generation to the next, perpetuating cycles of poverty, exclusion, and discrimination.

These negative effects can have far-reaching consequences, impacting not just the individuals directly affected, but also their families and communities.

Human Rights and Populism

Protecting and promoting human rights in the face of populism and stigmatization can be challenging (Bílková, 2019; Lake et al. 2021; Lynch&Sinclair, 2022; Mégret, 2022), as populist leaders and movements often use stigmatizing language and rhetoric to target marginalized groups, which can lead to discrimination and violations of human rights. However, there are several ways in which human rights can be protected and promoted in these contexts:

Strong legal protections: Having strong laws and institutions in place that protect human rights, such as independent judiciaries and human rights organizations, can help to ensure that marginalized groups are protected from discrimination and abuse.

Media and civil society: A free and independent media and a vibrant civil society can play an important role in promoting human rights by raising awareness of issues, holding politicians accountable and providing a platform for marginalized groups to voice their concerns.

International cooperation: International organizations such as the United Nations and regional human rights bodies can play an important role in promoting and protecting human rights by providing support and guidance to governments and civil society organizations.

Educating and building public awareness: Education and building public awareness of human rights and the negative effect of stigmatization is crucial. Populist leaders often use stigmatizing language to create fear and division, so it's important that people understand the facts and the impact of such rhetoric.

Supporting marginalized groups: Supporting marginalized groups and organizations that work to promote their rights can help to ensure that their voices are heard and that their rights are protected. This can include providing financial and other forms of support to organizations that work to promote human rights, as well as providing direct support to marginalized groups such as refugees and people with disabilities.

Encourage accountability and transparency: Populist movements and leaders often operate in an opaque manner, hiding behind slogans and rhetoric, so encouraging transparency and accountability in political process can help to ensure that human rights are protected and promoted.

It's important to mention that protecting and promoting human rights in the face of populism and stigmatization requires a multifaceted approach and the active participation of governments, civil society organizations, and individuals. When populist movements and leaders target marginalized groups, so it's important to be vigilant and to take action to protect human rights when they are threatened.

The Importance of Inclusive Policies and Programs

Inclusive policies and programs are essential in addressing the negative effects of populism and stigmatization (Updegaff, 2005), as they can help to promote equality and protect the rights of marginalized groups. Some of the keyways in which inclusive policies and programs can promote equality and protect human rights include such as addressing economic inequality, promoting social inclusion, protecting vulnerable groups, promoting diversity and cultural understanding and encouraging civic participation.

Encouraging civic participation is the one can be inclusive policies and programs such as voter registration drives, and civic education can help to increase civic participation and ensure that all voices are heard in the political process.

Inclusive policies and programs are an essential counterbalance to populism and stigmatization (Bimber, 1998), because they promote equality, protect the rights of marginalized groups, and foster a more inclusive society. It's important to aware that inclusive policies and programs require active engagement from government and civil society and need to be implemented in a way that is responsive to the needs of marginalized groups.

Civil society organizations (CSOs) and media play a crucial role in holding populist leaders and movements accountable and promoting human rights (Updegaff, 2005; Wall, 2017; Natil, 2020; Bourchier& Jusuf, 2022). The role of CSOs and media in this regard can be broken down as follows:

Civil society organizations: CSOs such as human rights organizations, advocacy groups, and community-based organizations can play a key role in holding populist leaders and movements accountable by raising awareness of human rights abuses, documenting violations, and advocating for policy changes. They can also provide support and resources to marginalized groups, helping them to advocate for their own rights.

Media: Media, particularly independent media, play a critical role in holding populist leaders and movements accountable by providing accurate and balanced coverage of political events, exposing corruption and abuse of power, and giving voice to marginalized groups. Media can also play a role in educating the public about human rights and the negative effects of stigmatization.

Monitoring and reporting: Both civil society organizations and media can monitor and report on the actions and statements of populist leaders and movements, highlighting any instances of stigmatization or discrimination, as well as any violations of human rights. This helps to ensure that these leaders and movements are held accountable for their actions and that the public is informed about these issues.

Providing a platform for marginalized groups: Civil society organizations and media can provide a platform for marginalized groups to voice their concerns, tell their stories, and advocate for their rights. This can help to ensure that the perspectives and needs of marginalized groups are heard and addressed.

Advocating for policy changes: Civil society organizations and media can advocate for policy changes that promote human rights and address the negative effects of populism and stigmatization. This can include advocating for laws and policies that promote equality and inclusiveness, such as anti-discrimination laws, affirmative action, and support for marginalized groups, as well as pushing for transparency and accountability in government and the media.

Civil society organizations and media play a vital role in holding populist leaders and movements accountable and promoting human rights (Bílková, 2019). They can monitor and report on the actions and statements of populist leaders, give a platform

to marginalized groups, and advocate for policy changes that promote equality and inclusiveness. A strong and independent civil society and media are essential for a healthy democracy and the protection of human rights.

Discussion and Conclusion

An interdisciplinary approach is crucial for understanding the complex relationship between populism, stigma, and human rights. This approach brings together perspectives and insights from various fields, including political science, sociology, psychology, and human rights studies, to provide a comprehensive understanding of the issues at hand.

For instance, political science can provide insights into the origins and characteristics of populist movements and leaders, while sociology can explore the social and economic factors that contribute to their rise. Meanwhile, psychology can offer an understanding of why certain individuals and groups may be drawn to populism, and how stigmatization and discrimination can be perpetuated by populist rhetoric. Human rights studies can examine the ways in which populism and stigmatization can lead to violations of human rights, and the strategies that can be employed to protect and promote human rights in the face of these challenges.

In addition to promoting the values and principles of human rights, it is also important to examine the social and economic factors that contribute to the rise of populist movements. For example, relative deprivation, social identity threat, and lack of representation in political and economic institutions can all contribute to support for populism. Providing a more complete understanding of the issues, an interdisciplinary approach can also lead to more effective strategies for addressing populism, stigmatization, and human rights. For instance, a political scientist may suggest electoral reforms to combat populist movements, while a sociologist may propose policies to address economic inequality. Together, these perspectives can inform a comprehensive strategy for promoting human rights and combating populism and stigmatization.

It is crucial to defend the values and principles of human rights in the face of populist ideologies and stigmatization. Populist ideologies and stigmatization often threaten human rights and should be combated by promoting an inclusive society and by addressing the underlying social and economic factors that contribute to the rise of populism. By doing so, we can ensure that all individuals are treated with dignity and respect, and that human rights are protected and promoted for all.

In conclusion, an interdisciplinary approach is essential for understanding the complex relationship between populism, stigma, and human rights. By bringing together perspectives from various fields, it can provide a comprehensive understanding of the issues, and inform more effective strategies for addressing them. It is important to consider the different aspects of the problem and the possible ways to solve it.

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Meliorism in the Pragmatist Discourse between Truth, Morality and Education

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Abstract

Philosophy in its traditional sense is regarded as a discipline that focuses on thought, reason and ideas. It is indifferent to action, where psychology, sociology and anthropology have taken this role. The pragmatists concern is the gap between thought and action. Returning the attention to action led to pragmatism being seen and valued more as a moral philosophy and behavioral psychology. This is precisely where the interest of this philosophy lies; how people can improve themselves and the world, expressed with the concept of 'meliorism'. Before that, James, Piers, etc. enter the philosophical discourse, revealing the principles and methodology of the study itself, the meaning and explanation of phenomena. Hence, the connection between gnosiology and morality is essential. The issue becomes even more complex, because from the discovery of the truth it moves to human identity, culture and the need for progress. The concreteness of this optimistic philosophy is achieved through education. Meanwhile, the discourse will arise between the questions: What is the truth for pragmatists? How is the relationship between truth, individual and society expressed phenomenologically? How can it be passed without harsh frustrations towards progress?

Keywords: meliorism, gnosiology, morality, education

Introduction

Pragmatism is a philosophical movement which started and was highly developed in the United States of America at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. Empiricism, romanticism and especially utilitarianism constitute the basis of this philosophical movement. Its main representatives are Charles Sanders Peirce (1839 – 1914), who is known as the founder of pragmatism (1870), formulating it first as a theory of meaning; William James (1842 – 1910), the most authoritative philosopher of this

movement; John Dewey (1859-1952), who was oriented towards education and social theories.

'*Pragmatic*' comes from the Greek '*pragma*' which means '*something done, a fact*' (Stumpf, 2000, p. 383) and '*pragmaticos*' means '*something active, the action of a man who knows how to do something concrete*'. In ancient Greek the word '*praxis*' refers to activity or commitment by free people. Aristotle claimed that there were two basic human activities: thought (theory) and practice (doing, action), which connected them to four causes: formal, material, operative and final (Stumpf, 2000, p. 90). In other words, pragmatism is the ability and process by which a theory, lesson or knowledge is applied, realized. '*Praxis*' refers to the act of engaging, applying, performing, realizing or implementing ideas. Aristotle distinguishes two forms of knowledge, the practical ones gained from experience, which he calls '*Phronesis*' and the abstract and theoretical knowledge called '*episteme*' (Gadamer, 2004, p. 312). '*Phronesis*' means knowledge carried by an active being, who goes through varied experiences (knowledge), but never identical to each other.

Referring to this meaning, pragmatism is seen as a philosophy of action and concrete life. It has often been criticized as immoral and atheistic, sometimes equating it with cynicism, sometimes as a behavior of personal interest, to the limits of machiavellianism. However, the pragmatist position insists on the humanism of its views, because man is placed in the center. What is noted here is the inevitable connection between the methodology in discovering the truth and the experience of the knowing subject. The answer to the question, what constitutes the criterion of truth?...would simultaneously explain the nature of the relationship between the idea and the fact? Consequently, reflection leads us to the moral judgment of the meaning of the connection between principle and action, behavior or attitude.

The truth between idea and fact

U. James explains us the relationship between fact and point of view. We should be interested in philosophy and also in the way we see or use fact. For example; a general is interested in the number of soldiers of the opposing army, but more essential for him would be the strategy, philosophy or form of organization of the opposing general. He will start to be interested in what ways he can use this fact, that is, the number of soldiers (James, 2005, p. 15). Fact and interpretation are in symbiosis and cannot be seen separated from each other. For James "... *the most interesting thing is how this philosophy determines the perspective on your world* " (James, 2005, p. 15), because it

emphasizes the inevitable relationship between the world and the human subject. Our perspective on the world, events, experiences, phenomena creates our entire reality, state and identity.

Milli earlier emphasized that man is the creator of himself and his world, because the mind is characterized by pragmatic limitlessness. The freedom understood in this idea means that man is not an imitator. He does not just choose the alternatives given to him, but has the ability to create according to his own way and experience. In Mill's notion, *freedom* is mostly a treatise on *individualism*. Individual freedom is understood as an independent but not isolated entity. The human being opens up to the world, creating himself. The notion of *eccentric* (Mill, 2015, p. 85), a term borrowed from astro-physics, illustrates the meaning of individuality. The subject is the center where the world is created, it manifests it as reality and this reality influences the entire social cosmos of which it is part. At the same time, during this process, the outside world also affects the subject. In this opening something new is always born, which sublimates the simple fact of being human. Precisely, this makes it special, authentic, not identical to others, thus creating a pluralistic human world. As a result, a value that Milli highly appreciates is obtained ; social diversity and diversity of life experiences. In this line of reasoning, James's pragmatism would affirm that we live in a plurality of worldviews (James, 2005, p. 19)..

The history of philosophy itself appears to us as a debate between two different attitudes, between empiricists and rationalists, where each side claims to have the right method to get to the truth. W. James does not like such a division between 'empiricists', who believe in the variety of facts, and on the other hand 'rationalists', who emphasize absolute, abstract and eternal principles. Like Schiller, James believes that "*Man needs both facts and principles, but the question is which one of them is emphasized more...?*" (James, 2005, p. 19). For a pragmatist to be intellectually satisfied "... *there is an attraction to the good things of both sides*" (James, 2005, p. 22). The world is sometimes understood as rational and sometimes as empirical, sometimes understood as one and sometimes as a diversity. The meaning of one absolutely does not exclude the other. We must accept this democratic principle of knowing the world. It is both this and that, "... *thus undertaking a kind of monistic pluralism*" (James, 2005, p. 22). Reality is a combination of the two attitudes. We must accept this symbiosis of two opposite sides of the world, however paradoxical it may seem. Consequently, first we have our viewpoint and then we act, we behave in accordance with our worldview. Also,

we should always respect the other individual, regardless of the contradiction we may have in terms of point of view or way of living.

On this account, pragmatists emphasize the notion of '*adaptation*'. Between the idea and the fact, the truth is found in the adaptation between them, that is, how the idea corresponds to the fact. Separated from each other we would have an empiricism without humanity and an illusory rationalism (James, 2005, p. 28).

The humanization of truth

"According to the pragmatic principle, *we cannot reject any kind of hypothesis if it has consequences of value for life*" (James, 2005, 197). In this principle, truth is measured by value. But how does the truth take value? What differentiates the truth from the lie is the practical criterion. The truth is related to the situation, that's where it takes on value. The example James gives is this: "*If they ask me; What time is it?... and I tell you that I live at Irwin. Street 95', I may have told you the correct answer, but it is untrue because it does not apply*" (James, 2005, p. 168). So in this case, how to give the correct address as incorrect, it does not change anything, because it has no value for the concrete situation. Just as the triangle area formula holds true when we are measuring the area of the triangle. The formula remains worthless if we need to find the area of the square. We can give theoretical principles on the phenomenon, but if we do not respond to the demands of concrete circumstances, they remain empty discourses.

"*...pragmatism unified for people the realm of fact and value*" (Stumpf, 2000, p. 383). Obviously, pragmatism leans on empiricism, because it sets as a condition for the truth, its consequence in the concrete world. Principles and ideas in themselves, as abstractions of thought, become true, i.e. they take value only if they correspond to the factual reality. Meanwhile, reality is dynamic, diverse and changeable, this means that truth is random in ideas. Ideas are potentially true. The truth is a possibility and is realized only when it is good, and good for pragmatists means when it serves the concrete fact. So, the truth belongs to the occasion, the circumstances of the actuality, it is contextual. There are no eternal and universal principles. Different ideas serve to explain or give meaning to different situations. Hence, we postulate that there are no universal, eternal and absolute moral principles.

James claims that principles and concepts cannot supersede reality and dominate it. "*...theories become not answers to enigmas, but instruments that can be helpful*" - writes James (James, 2005, p. 50). They can help us to explain

and provide solutions to concrete experiences. In the sense of moral situations, they can be used as tools in order to deal with dilemmas, moral contradictions or to justify a certain behavior. Different theories and views on morality serve us to solve or understand diverse moral situations such as; duty, responsibility, right, good and bad. Pragmatism is seen as a solution to the theoretical contradictions of morality, providing the condition of value and practical utility. A moral situation is explained and understood by a theory or a set of ideas that discuss the event. While other moral theories, which do not respond to this reality, remain untrue. The starting point is not from abstraction, heavenly ideas, but their extension to earthly experience.

For Piers "*... thinking always occurs in a context and not detached from it*" (Sumf, 2000, p. 384). The truth of the pragmatists is presented as a symbiosis between rationalism and empiricism. Here the humanism of pragmatism appears, where truth and understanding derive from experience (Stumpf, 2000, p. 384). Human experience underlies everything. In this sense, truth is part of the process of experience and not separate from it. We must explain the truth of the event, referring to its own requirements. Phenomena should be judged based on the authenticity of the claims, where the situation gives value to the idea.

Morally, it is seen as a behavior that expresses thought, where thought also shows behavior at the same time. Morality is formed as a connection or perfect match of idea with behavior. For example, my belief, value and principle is not to steal, so is the action, but when someone steals to survive, I give up my original principle and start judging based on the specific circumstances, justifying the action of someone who stole. Then I think that stealing is punishable, but in the conditions of survival it is acceptable, which means that I will also allow myself in the conditions of survival. But what if someone is just a lazy person and has brought himself to survival conditions, how will he be judged morally? If it is so, when the circumstances change, in the deepest sense of the situation, I will have to reformulate my principle: stealing is punishable, but in the conditions of survival and absolute impossibility, I would also allow myself to carry out this act. Indirectly I morally condemn laziness. Someone else can think differently, for him, above all, survival dominates regardless of the causes so in this case his principle will be: stealing is punishable, but in the conditions of survival, regardless of the factors that have led me to this state, I would also commit it as act. So the principle matches the action perfectly.

At the core of pragmatist philosophy lies human life, because "*... practical means the way in which thought leads to action*" (Stumpf, 2000f, p. 382). Piers

shares the opinion that “... *our beliefs serve as rules for action*” (James, 2005, p. 45). Our behavior, actions or attitudes depend entirely on the thoughts, beliefs, worldview or personal values in which we believe or identify ourselves as particular individuals. Good or bad, right or wrong, is always judged by personal conviction and worldview. Then between thought and action lies faith. For Piers there are three forms of faith:

- a) *Persistence – belief in the ideas of culture and social tradition*
- b) *Authority – refers to the authority to act*
- c) *Metaphysics – the belief that something is acceptable from reason*

Which of these beliefs should we rely on? Piers rejects all three ***because they do not support the unique experience of the individual.***

Thus:


- a) *The method of persistence is an irrational action, it is an action from a blind faith.*
- b) *The method of authority excludes reflection*
- c) *The metaphysical method is realized by avoiding the facts (Stumpf, 2000, p.385)*

Further, Piers would emphasize that “... *the meaning of a thought is enough to clarify what behavior it will cause for us and that behavior is the only thing that matters*” (James, 2005, p. 45). By 'cause' we mean all kinds of concrete consequences. The effects it leaves as; certain feelings, reactions, behaviors or attitudes. The consequences of thought in a practical sense matter both for immediate and later effects.

From this reasoning, the question arises; does pragmatism defend the functionalist view? The answer is yes! Truth is called such if it has a practical function. Truth is utilitarian, and for utilitarians, utility is the essential criterion of moral justification. For James – “... *an idea is true as long as it serves our life. If you benefit from something, you accept with pleasure that it is good*” (James, 2005, p. 63) - James continues - “...*truth is a kind of good and not as it is usually considered - a category separated from the good that cooperates with the latter. Truth is called anything that gives evidence that it is good in the sense of belief and also for clear and certain reasons*” (James, 2005, p. 64). The truth is known from experience, that is, from what we really believe, from our principles, ideas or worldviews. Pragmatism is a moral philosophy, because for it, ideas gain value if they serve the action, the concrete condition. Truth necessarily plays a function, and the function is understood as good.

Logically, the truth is necessarily good, that is, it contains the good, because we really believe it as such or that it serves a concrete purpose. Truth is moral (good) and morality is knowledge (true).

Truth is a possibility for ideas, which correspond to the human moment, which means that truth is functional, that is, it responds to the authentic circumstances of experience. Understanding truth as possibility means that it responds to the spontaneous, dynamic and free character of man and social life. The truth is not imposed by building systems, where man is put at the service of the latter. If it has no function in human life or experience, then it is alienated into an oppressive mechanism. Thus for pragmatism, the truth is deeply humanistic, because in the center of attention there is man with his experience and perspectives, with his constant change, in a reality that is characterized by possibility or surprise, giving importance to the moment and his concrete (real) situation.



Conceptual scheme of the humanization of truth according to pragmatic philosophy

- Meliorism: the moral progress of the individual and society

"Nothing is more powerful than an idea whose time has come."

Victor Hugo

The mutual relationship between idea and experience is the essential point of pragmatism, as the criterion that reveals truth. It means that knowledge is presented to us as a matter of morality and morality as a matter of knowledge. Schiller and Dewey emphasize the fact that *"Ideas become true as long as they help us create good relationships with other parts of experience"* (James, 2005, p. 53). Even here it is understood why people change their values and worldviews.

Man is a dynamic being, characterized by free will. He is constantly in a process of socialization and resocialization. Man shapes himself and his identity in a continuous process of doing and undoing, it is a process of self-creation that does not stop. "*The individual paradoxically has a set of old thoughts, but is faced with a new experience that puts them in a difficult position*" (James, 2005, p. 53). We constantly change ideas, attitudes, worldviews and beliefs, because experience always brings us to new, unknown circumstances, inexplicable for old concepts or principles. New ideas or situations do not follow a deterministic, certain order, because as we have emphasized, man is not only free to choose, but free to create and at the same time to create himself. Free will means opportunity. The opportunity, on the other hand, also justifies punishment, i.e. taking responsibility, because theft, lying, murder cannot even happen, regardless of the circumstances. Man is not only in the conditions of the choices of alternatives that are offered to him by the external reality, He is the creator and processor of the situation, that also brings it to the function of improvement.

This phenomenological relationship makes him special, not identical to others in his interpretation of the world and understanding of himself. You can clearly see the stoicism of the pragmatists with the principle: The world is as we make it. She is "*plastic*" - writes James (James, 2005, p. 178). We create reality, phenomena and events, and creation is simultaneously their recognition. We go out into the world and then use this experience to find ourselves, to understand ourselves, to be ourselves. (James, 2005, p. 141). In this perspective, for pragmatism "*free will is seen as a **meliorist** doctrine*" (James, 2005, p. 92).

Meliorism means that the world can be improved by human efforts. (<https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/meliorism>).

Meliorism is an idea of metaphysical thinking emphasizing progress. This concept shows how the truth leads to the improvement of the world. Humans, through their intervention in processes that would otherwise be natural, can produce an outcome that is an improvement of the world and themselves. Here pragmatists differ from Kant's idea that history operates on a plan that presents a progress of nature, which reaches an unification such as cosmopolis, or universal history (Sinani, 1999, p. 75). Meliorism is not a deterministic and linear process. The improvement can go in unthinkable and unpredictable directions, this is because the very development of man and society goes through dynamic situations and circumstances are so special that it is almost impossible to generalize.

However, change does not come immediately. "Time and space, cause and effect, nature and history and biography of the individual are not affected. However, change does not come immediately. *"Time and space, cause and effect, nature and history and biography of the individual are not affected. The new truth is always a middle way, facilitating the transition. It connects the old thought with the new fact so that the knot is as little conspicuous as possible and the continuity as much as possible"* (James, 2005, p. 54). What is observed in this process is the discrepancy between the old worldview and the new experience. Precisely the contradictory (dialectical) situation also creates attitudes! The change of principles and attitudes comes in an evolutionary process, almost naturally, unconsciously. In the end, personal, authentic identity and moral behavior is an indicator of experience, of what we deeply believe, so it is shaped over time. Our morality stems from history and people's experiences are distinct from each other. The essence of history, of life experience, is that it is difficult to accept what is new, what changes our belief or worldview created in time. Therefore, we often remain conservative in the morals that come from our experience. Conservative of our time and this is where the clash of generations begins, eg parents are often authoritarian, moralistic and out of date because they trust their time, experience and morality, which is absolutely different from that of their children.

According to J. Dewey the source of evil can also be seen here. Evil does not come from the vital force that characterizes man. *"Evil is rather a product of the particular ways in which a culture shapes and conditions human impulses"* (Stumpf, 2000, p. 395). Evil arises from the immutability of the formed habit. Habit imposes certain behaviors by referring to predetermined, universal principles or rules, which are not interested in reading the specific situation and circumstances. Thus, the moral code of a society is seen as suppressing the need of man to change, to be himself or to interpret the situation, the dynamic and changing circumstances based on the experience of the individual worldview. The habit uses the same principles for different situations. Like that anecdote; that the one who was left in the well and the one who was left on top of the pillar were saved in the same way, by pulling the rope. To one it was valuable and helpful; to the other it caused pain. In the conditions of dynamic life, of diverse situations or diverse experiences, we find it impossible to create a list of rules as a moral prescription, which means that we cannot form an ideal structure of moral principles, as habit does, because everything is judged in the particularity of the moment. Then the habit is placed in conflict with the necessity to change, refusing to immediately accept the new. This step

comes as a result of time demanding acceptance, a kind of compromise for change that the old must make, showing the conflict between what is and what is to come.

Education as a necessary condition for the realization of meliorism

The essential role to make the transition without harsh frustrations, from the old crystallized to the new experience, is taken by the intellect, for the very fact that it is not an entity that consists of static concepts. It has the power to face the environment and adapt to its authentic demands. Intellect is the means to move forward, to improve the situation, that is why Dewey, called his pragmatism *'instrumentalism'* (Stumpf, 2000, p. 394). The dialectic of man and societies appears in the conflict between habit, the idea of persistence as described by Piers or faith, his collective identity that constitutes the old and the special, new situation with the aim of regulating relations with the surroundings. The conflict develops between society and the individual as a special value. Pre-established principles and rules, hardened by tradition, indicate some ways of behavior, but not that they are always necessary. *"... the key to conceptualizing individual and social evil is changing the habits of society, its habits of reaction and thought"* (Stumpf, 2000, p. 395). The meliorist power belongs to education, because it perfects the instrument, that is, the intellect, which shakes the habit until its change and makes the individual and the creative society.

Improvement is seen as a sign of emancipation, which is an evolutionary process characterized by conflict. A kind of conflict where the subject is totally committed to solving it, even anxious to solve it. This is where the revolt, the rebellion appears, which show the moment of the explosion, the beginning of the new or the change for the better.

Societies that know how to maintain and manage this conflict are inclined towards development and improvement. However, this does not mean that the most ancient ways of thinking and living, even the most primitive ones, will disappear. *"The new truths are the result of new experiences and old truths, which combine and influence each other on both sides. And since this is how opinion changes today, we have no reason to suppose that it has not always been so. It follows that among all the late changes in human thought, very ancient ways of thinking may have survived. Even the most primitive ones have not completely disappeared"* (James, 2005, p. 126). Thought which legitimizes the understanding of the individual and society today through history, ethnography and anthropology. Societies develop, but they also preserve what

they were in the past, because as we said, the change is not revolutionary, as a complete separation from the old, but evolutionary. The change of man, his historical meaning based on life experience, developed within a certain social culture or tradition, is cultivated from generation to generation. Therefore, the collective identity, influencing the behavior, attitudes, and world views of the individual, is often explained on the basis of the historical times that the society has inherited. The old, the tradition, the past can be hidden, but from time to time, unconsciously, behaviors of the individual appear which belong to much earlier eras. For example; we as Albanian individuals or Albanian society sometimes bring out the Byzantine character, sometimes the Ottoman character; or different historical eras that have shaped the anthropocultural stratification from which our behavior and communication can be understood even today.

As a conclusion:

a. Truth is a potential, possibility, where the idea meets dynamic reality.

b. The truth is random in ideas, because it depends on the concrete situation with particular circumstances (authentic)

c. Truth is moral (good), because it responds to dynamic human nature, experience and concrete life.

d. As a consequence of the above two points; pragmatism as a theory of truth is equivalent to humanism.

e. Pragmatism defends the meliorist view, where it emphasizes the moral progress over time of man and societies

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The founding elements of Enlightenment philosophy: the relationship between language, knowledge and society

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Abstract

This paper aims to examine the most important aspects of Enlightenment philosophy (and its main authors: Locke, Condillac, Diderot, Beccaria, Montesquieu) with special reference to the following topics: 1. The analysis of cognitive faculties and denial of the existence of innate ideas; 2. The criticisms of the concept of absolute authority; 3. The sovereignty and freedom of the individual; 4. Cartesian dualism between soul and body, between thought and matter. 5. The rejection of anthropocentrism led to criticism of providentialism; 6. The relationship between man and animals, and the discussions about the matter of animal language. This new formulation of ideas from the century of Enlightenment is of fundamental importance, and although not all of the hoped-for objectives were achieved – for example, those concerning human rights – their ideal was widely accepted, and those who criticise the existing order today do so in the name of Enlightenment.

Keywords: Philosophy of enlightenment, Political Science, Materialism, Philosophy of language.

Introduction

Criticism of authoritarianism

One of the themes of Enlightenment philosophy that remains particularly interesting today is the secular conception of man and his faculties, with its underlying denial of the existence of innate ideas, and rejection of the belief that there are innate principles in the human mind, present - explicitly or only potentially – from birth. Principles like, for example, the logical principle of non-contradiction (“A is not not-A”), mathematical principles (equality, proportion, etc.), or practical and moral principles like the ideas of Virtue and duty, and the ideas of Good and of God.

Among the most influential leading lights of the age of Enlightenment, John Locke dedicated the most thought to this theme in his fundamental *Essay on human understanding* (1690). He emphasised, on the one hand, the fact that we learn

everything from sensations alone, given that no cognition or idea springs from a principle that exists prior to experience, and on the other, how the denial of innate ideas can cast doubt on the principle of goodness, beauty and absolute perfection – a perfection rooted in something that precedes the existence of the subjects that contain it, and is thus eternal, immutable, necessary, primordial and independent of those subjects.

In Locke's view, then, man does not possess original or primary characteristics impressed into his mind from birth, because his mind, at the initial moment of his existence, is in fact a blank sheet, completely without characteristics or ideas (Locke 1690: 593). Locke observed that only successively, and very gradually, does a child begin to formulate ideas which, without presupposing anything remotely innate, are derived solely from two sources or fountains: sensation and reflection (or interior perception). There are no ideas in the mind aside from those that have been impressed there by these two sources, which constitute experience, the only thing that provides the materials of human reasoning. As all of 18th-century gnoseology - from Hume to Kant – would assert, there can be no use of the intellect outside of experience: contrary to Descartes, according to this viewpoint, reflection is a part of experience, and although not a true "sense," because it has no relationship with external objects, is something very similar. In fact, Locke defined it as "internal sense" (Locke 1690: 594).

The confutation of innatism had political significance, given its association with criticism of the concept of absolute authority. The denial of innate and incontrovertible principles was fused with the political and religious liberalism of which Locke was also a proponent¹. This concept of privileging autonomous individual choices, unconditioned by the impositions of any external authority, is fundamental, and ties in with man's emancipation from dogmas and institutions considered untouchable, like religious ones, for example. The result of this emancipation is the possibility of open and free discussion; the Enlightenment stimulated the cultivation of a critical spirit, but one that must not be excessive, otherwise it would become a generalised denigration, and that must not be an end unto itself. Hence, it must always present a positive counterbalance: generalised scepticism and systematic derision only seem to make sense on a superficial level, deviating from the spirit of Enlightenment and creating an immense obstacle to its action (Todorov 2006: 48).

The tradition continued to be important in any case, but is not in itself sufficient to render a principle legitimate. Diderot, for example, defined the philosopher and the thinking man as one capable of thinking independently, without allowing himself to be conditioned by tradition, authority and prejudice. This is one of the

¹ A theme widely discussed in critical literature, for example in Hazard (1963), Venturi (1970), Moravia (1982: 128 ss), Casini (1994: 23-35), Franzini (2009: 37-47).

fundamental principles of the Enlightenment - *Sapere aude!* – emphasised by both Montesquieu (1748: I, 58) and Kant¹.

Independence, however, did not mean self-sufficiency: relations with society and interaction with others are fundamental to man; he could not live without them, and human qualities and language itself ensue from them. Without relationships with others, we would be unable to have a perception of ourselves and our existence. This was a theme of great concern to Rousseau, who wrote that our existence is collective and our truest self is not entirely within us (Rousseau 1772-76: I, 813). De Sade has been much-stigmatised from this point of view, given that he made self-sufficiency a rule to live by and considered his own pleasure the only important thing, without any need to bear in mind what others thought or felt; for him, solidarity with others was something that hindered men from being independent. Todorov considers De Sade's position contrary not only to the spirit of Enlightenment, but also to common sense (Todorov 2006: 41-42)².

Enlightenment thinkers also maintained that in order for emancipation to be effective and concrete, there must be complete freedom to analyse, discuss and doubt. The individual must no longer be subject to precepts that are legitimised solely by the fact that tradition considers them valid; no authority, regardless of its solidity or the prestige it enjoys, is immune from criticism (Todorov 2006: 11).

This need led to the generation of two fundamental principles of Enlightenment philosophy that underlie the liberal constitutions of western countries today: the sovereignty and freedom of the individual. The former focuses on the fact that all power is derived from the people, and nothing is superior to the general will: as Rousseau clearly underscored, the origin of power is not divine, but human, so any form of power is not transmitted, but merely entrusted, and the people can always take back what they have temporarily lent to a government (Rousseau 1761: 170). The latter highlights both pluralism and the division of powers, with two important consequences: the first concerns the separation between religious and political power, based on the principle that the ultimate end point of free human action is no longer God, but men themselves. The second addresses the separation between legislative, executive and judicial powers; this is a fundamental point, because the separation of powers, from Locke onwards (Viano 1960: 223-25), has been at the core of modern constitutionalist doctrine, which guarantees that the people who carry out functions linked with each of these powers are subject to the law. The power that governs a society is obligated to govern through laws to which it itself is subject. These principles led to the condemnation of absolutism espoused first by Locke, and then by the authors of the *Encyclopédie*, who intended

¹ The famous "Answering the question: What is Enlightenment?" now in Kant (1965: 141)

² Todorov's interest in the Enlightenment is demonstrated by his fundamental *Nous et les autres. La réflexion française sur la diversité humaine* (1989), *Les Morales de l'histoire* (1991), and his monographic study on *L'esprit des Lumières* del 2006.

“absolute” to mean a government that does not concern itself with obtaining consensus and does not recognise that it has obligations towards its subjects, or a government that reserves the right to follow a political line even without the approval of those it governs, and to defend interests that conflict with theirs.

In this sense, the Enlightenment is a humanism (Todorov 2006: 15)¹ that acknowledges the inalienability of human rights, which are universal, and it is thanks to their universality that men can be considered equals, by right: equality stems from universality. An example is the right to life and to individual safety and integrity, due to which practices like the death penalty and torture – long accepted in Europe – came to be considered inhumane.

Over the course of the 18th century, jurisprudence itself went through a fundamental phase of theoretical reconsideration and revision of its own conceptual presuppositions; the essential reference on this point is Beccaria’s treatise *Dei delitti e delle pene* (1764), in which the author advocated a secular, desacralized conception of law that broke with age-old tradition, differentiating crime from sin and establishing that the law must concern itself not with fault, but with damages wrought by individuals on society². Polemical regarding the obscurity of law, Beccaria had argued in favour of the rule of law and the efficacy of juridical communication: he was a harsh critic of the use of Latin, which at the time was still widespread in jurisprudence, contending that laws, since they concerned the entire population, must be expressed in common language so as to be understood by all. In order to be truly useful, reason – the guiding principle of law – must be shared by the community³.

The assertion of the universality of rights also had the important consequence of drawing attention to peoples with different mentalities and customs than Europeans – not to the point of ending the prejudices with which scholars had considered other peoples, but it certainly contributed to changing their way of thinking and awakening interest and curiosity about other cultures, and keeping them from confusing their own tradition with the natural order of the world (Beccaria 1764: 17).

Materialism

The Enlightenment movement also comprised within it a more radical line of thought which, taking cues from the denial of innatism, came to conceive of matter as the limit or boundary within which lie not only all of our knowledge, but our

¹ This idea is also developed in several points by Todorov (1991); see also Todorov (2002: 238-81).

² See Venturi’s observation on this (1969: 698): “Beccaria thus ended up denying any connection between the religious conception of evil, original sin and sin in general with the science of legislation, fully deconsecrating the legal relationship and thus leaving man alone in the face of his own responsibility. Laws were his work, and their logic was completely human”.

³ See Beccaria (1764: 41 ff).

impulses and pleasures as well. Consequently, our desires and our sensations, including the more spiritual ones, never extend beyond the material, and even the most spiritual and imaginary and indeterminate happiness we might taste or desire is never, and can never be, anything other than material, and thus depends on the state of the body. Thought is tied to sensation (knowing is feeling); it is an attribute of matter, and with this, we have clearly transcended Cartesian dualism between soul and body, between thought and matter. Matter is active; it is not mere extension. Thought is not a spiritual or immaterial entity separate from the body, but is an integral part of it, because in man, matter itself is sentient and rational: the brain, not the soul (Timpanaro 1969: 160). For example, Holbach maintained that when we know something, we feel our body at the same time, and it is this body that feels, thinks, judges, suffers and rejoices, so all of its faculties prove necessary to its particular mechanism and organisation (Holbach 1770: I, 120).

For Diderot as well, the existence of the soul as an autonomous and heterogeneous substance, separate from the body, was unsubstantiated; thus in his writing he never spoke of union or harmony between body and soul like other “philosophe” (e.g. Buffon, Condillac, Helvétius) but of substantial identity (Moravia 1974: 158-60). Thus the soul cannot be considered a simple (i.e., immaterial and lacking extension), single and indivisible substance. The presumed immortality of the soul and the consequent belief in an afterlife is excluded without hesitation. Holbach also maintained that when a man dies, all of him dies, and that “l’esprit ou la substance inétendue et immatérielle, n’est qu’une absence d’idées” (Holbach 1770: I, 200)¹. The most radical and original positions in 18th-century materialist philosophy were thus far removed from those that conceive of man first and foremost as an active, creative force, capable of overcoming his own finiteness, identifying in himself a Spinozian nature.

The most important exponents of French materialism were aware of the fact that man, as a natural and sensitive creature, cannot consider himself the purpose of all creation; hence the rejection of any anthropocentric bias and the derision of men’s pretence of being created in the image of God with a different, more important destiny and role than other living beings. Likewise, the pretence of considering the earth to be the centre of the universe was also rejected.

The rejection of anthropocentrism led to criticism of providentialism, according to which man imagines himself favoured by God, and thus believes that the universe was created for him, and that his life and personal vicissitudes are at the heart of all of nature. The intention of Enlightenment thinkers – in particular Louis-François Jauffret, who in 1799 in Paris founded the *Société des Observateurs de l’homme*, which Cabanis and Tracy also joined – was, rather, to study human

¹ Still fundamental in this regard, Timpanaro (1985).

behaviour from the moral, physical and intellectual points of view, with reference to testable facts as opposed to abstract, spiritualistic theories. Todorov had great appreciation for the fact that the research carried out by these *philosophes* was based on the idea that the key to interpreting human behaviour and passions was habituation or conformability: nature provides man with a limited number of faculties which are developed through confrontation with various elements, like weather, so the weather/character relationship was one way to target investigation of the interaction between man and the environment, stripping principles of transcendence from man as much as possible (Gensini 1984: 36 n. 24);

The social and political organisation, the natural environment, etc., also constitute habits, lifestyles, customs, and varied and diverse languages. Habituation, then, is also an important element in the conformation and development of man's cognitive and linguistic faculties, which in turn depend considerably on circumstances and education.

The question of the human/animal relationship

The rejection of anthropocentrism also engendered interest in the relationship between man and animals, and in the problem of whether animals have souls, long debated in 18th-century philosophy¹, and also tied to discussions about the matter of animal language. This was a particularly important question if we consider the theoretical context in which 17th-century rationalism had initially raised it – a context of deep-rooted scholarly identification between rationality and the immortal soul, and in which Descartes, in his 1637 *Discours de la methode*, had asserted the clear separation between animals and man, denying any form of language and creativity in the former. Descartes used the denial of animal language to counter the Gassendian scepticism and materialism that undermined the idea of man's primacy in the natural kingdom and contested his position at the centre of the universe. Against this conception, which had also been espoused by Montaigne, Descartes countered with a radical anthropomorphism, considering human communication as a privileged, unique and exclusive activity, and language the dividing line, the insuperable boundary between humans and all other living beings. Clearly separating the soul from the body, Descartes asserted that the latter - and by extension beasts, which do not have souls – is purely mechanical, and machines, without some outside influence, are inert. In the context of this view, the human body is activated by the soul, which is also the seat of language, considered exclusive to man since animals lack the spiritual principle of the soul.

The Cartesian position was contested by Enlightenment philosophical and scientific thinkers with the aim of demonstrating that even beasts possess a form of language that allows them to communicate with animals of their own species, as

¹ For an examination of this theme, see Prato (2012: 23-38).

well as other species. And the debate began with Locke's *Essay on human understanding* in the part (the third book) dedicated to language. Locke acknowledged that human language is made up of general signs constructed through a process of abstraction. Abstraction, to Locke, mean separating an element from its context; whiteness never appears on its own, but is presented as the simple idea of a perceptible quality found, for example, in the milk we drank the day before. When we eliminate everything that ties that idea to that particular situation, it becomes representative of all other similar qualities that can be found in the most disparate elements that one can see or experience (Locke, E II/XI, 9).

The existence of general terms allows language to be understood by all those who utilise it, regardless of different individual mentalities; this is the condition of intersubjectivity, and thus of language itself. Generality or universality does not pertain to the real essence of things, but to the activity of the intellect; and here we can grasp the difference between Locke's concept of abstraction and that of the scholastic philosophy with which it is polemically contrasted, precisely because Locke did not believe that human intellect could grasp the real essence of things. By creating abstract ideas and marking them with names, people "enable themselves to think and talk in bundles, as it were" (E III/III, 20), and this facilitates the organisation and communication of representations. General ideas formed in this way are the nominal essence of things, the only essence that we can know. The real essences of things – which we must certainly presume exist in that the perceptible quality on the basis of which we distinguish and catalogue things springs from them -, are unknown to us. If there are constant and indissoluble causal connections that bind together the substantial structure of reality, the English philosopher maintained that they can only be determined by God's intellect, and not by man, and in any case – and this is the most important thing -, they have no part in the mechanism of signification. As Hume also affirmed, concepts are relations of ideas, and not actual substance.

The abstracting function of the mind is the criteria that differentiates man from animals, because the other mental faculties (memory, discernment, judgment) are, in Locke's opinion, common to all sentient beings, which possess them in different forms and degrees (Locke E II/X, 10). Only the faculty of abstraction is man's alone, not all of the faculties of the soul. So there are no grounds of principle to exclude the possibility that animal species have some form of sense, albeit different from and more limited than the nominal essences conceived by the human mind (E II/XI, 11).

This led Locke to attribute some form of language to animals, certainly much less developed than human language, but commensurate with their needs and awareness.

Locke's considerations contributed to fueling the debate on the language of animals, which in the 18th century became an opportunity for considered reflection

on the relationship between man and animals. Ascribing animals with their own, admittedly far less-evolved form of language thus meant liberating reason from its theological burden and inserting man into a natural continuum in which beings differ in terms of level, as opposed to essence. This entails posing the question of the relationship between body and soul in new terms once again, evaluating the possibility that matter has more than a merely passive function in the formation and development of knowledge (Locke E IV/III, 6).

In the course of the 18th century, thanks in part to prospects opened up by Locke's system, there was an increasing tendency to consider animal language as a fully autonomous communications system with its own rules, in many ways analogous to the human language system. This was due in particular to two different but interrelated factors. The first was the change in perspective concerning man's place in the universe, whereby man was no longer considered to be nature's ultimate purpose, the most perfect of all living beings, created in God's image. The second factor, mentioned above, was the different conception of sensation asserted by the *philosophes*, starting with Locke's criticism of innate ideas, i.e., that sensation was not simply an opportunity for knowledge, but its very foundation, confuting the traditional distinction between inferior and superior forms of humanity. Reason was no longer considered an incommensurable faculty compared to sensibility, as it moulds the mind to achieve its most complex manifestations of knowledge and thought. Reason thus began to be considered a more complex form of sensibility, and no longer a specifically human attribute.

In the *Histoire des animaux* (1749), Buffon individuated two meanings for the term "feeling": a movement corresponding to a shock or a resistance, and the faculty to perceive and compare perceptions. In the *Animal* entry written for the first volume of the *Encyclopédie* published in 1751, Diderot added a third meaning related to the sentiments of pleasure and pain and self-awareness (Diderot 1751: 101). In fact, Diderot plainly acknowledged the substantial continuity between man and animals based on the "sensibility" that pertains to the entire sphere of living beings, of which man is simply a particular case; and La Mettrie, in *Homme machine* (1751), attributed animals, to a certain degree, with both a form of reason and the faculty of imagination, effectively corroborating the thesis of man's savage, natural origin so detested by spiritualist philosophers and the Church.

Cartesian philosophy had established a scission between these different forms of sensibility: the stimulus response mechanism was considered totally different from perceiving and feeling emotions, and in fact was associated with the *res extensa*, while the other two forms of knowledge were linked to the *res cogitans*. The outcome of this distinction was the concept of the *bête machine*, capable of sensation but incapable of feeling and comparing emotions. In 18th-century philosophy, on the other hand, these three meanings of "feeling" were brought back together, leading to the complete revision, if not the total abandonment, of

the *bête machine* concept. Even Buffon, who in many respects continued to utilise the Cartesian theoretical model, demonstrated in various parts of his work that he considered Cartesian animal automatism outmoded, and even came to suggest that animals were conscious of their own existence, considerably reducing the distance that separated them from man.

In his *Traité des animaux* (1755), Condillac emphasised sensation as a matter of awareness that lay in the spiritual sphere as well as the physical, and then outlined a picture of the development of animal faculties deriving from sensation in an analogous way to the development of human faculties, but asserting that animals' abilities cannot reach human levels because animals have limited needs and a differently formed phonic apparatus. In the human mind, the passage from the simultaneity of thought to the seriality of speech develops through an analytical process in which we can observe what we do when we think. This led Condillac to consider languages as analytical methods. Language is thus not structured solely for the purpose of communication, but is also a crucial tool for analysing thought and breaking it down into discrete segments (Simone 1992: 155). Condillac's interest in signs stemmed from the form of empiricism itself: mental activity can occur only if it has a perceptible material support. As long as one is standing before a rose, or a dog, thought consists of the sensation derived from the subject's relationship with this element of the real world; this is a process that man has in common with animals. But when the object of thought is the number 2, or a dog in general, there is nothing in the real world that can elicit that particular sensation. It is arbitrary language that designates ideas that are not given in nature, which is very different from the natural language of animals. In this case, language is necessary for thought, because otherwise there would be no way to dominate the diversity of phenomena, and because certain objects of thought do not correspond to sensations, i.e., ideas. The key to activating the faculties of the soul, from memory to imagination, is the "liaison des idées".

This new formulation of ideas from the century of Enlightenment (concerning materialism, human rights, political science and linguistics) is of fundamental importance, and although not all of the hoped-for objectives were achieved – for

example, those concerning human rights - , their ideal was widely accepted, and those who criticise the existing order today do so in the name of Enlightenment.

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Between rurality and urbanity: Indicators of social integration of Albanian rural to urban migrants

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Abstract

Integration of rural to urban migrants represents a complex experience of learning and adapting to a community with a new and different culture. Despite the changes in the way of living and the modifications of cultural values due to social interaction and coexistence with urban subculture, most of migrants moved from village to the city retain a sense of rurality. Internal migration in Albania often takes place in form of chain migration. Therefore, the concentration of migrants to the peripheral part of the city, rural social networks, kinship interaction, financial and social support impact their social and cultural integration to urban subculture. This paper aims to highlight indicators of social integration of Albanian migrants moved from village to the city. Data for this paper was obtained through a quantitative survey method. 400 surveys were conducted with Albanian migrants moved from villages to Korça city which remains the second most important destination, besides Tirana, for migrants from rural areas of the southeastern part of Albania. Descriptive and correlative statistical analysis was used for data interpretation. Rurality is not only a territorial unit, but derives from socially created meanings. The study showed that sense of rurality impacts the patterns and strategies of integration of rural to urban migrants to the city.

Keywords: chain migration, integration, social network, rurality, role of tradition

Introduction

Albanian rural to urban migration is characterized by massive population of urban areas and depopulation of rural areas. For the first time in history of Albanian Census the number of people living in the city overcome the number of people living in the village. 53.7% of Albanian people live in urban areas while 46.3% live in rural areas (Albanian Population and Housing Census 2011). These demographic and social developments are closely related to modernity.

Among the main push factors which impact the decision to migrate from village to the city remain economic conditions, low income, unemployment, low access to public services, etc. While the pull factors are related to better opportunities to employment and education, the living standard in urban areas etc. Albanian rural to urban migration has affected a lot the urban community mainly in terms of high urban concentration of the population, rapid and wild urbanization, risk of `ruralisation` of urban areas, concentration of internal migrants to the peripheral part of the city, mainly to informal areas, related to the "flocking effect" of migration. People moved from village to the city face the challenges of integration to the host society. They carry on values, norms, ideas, features of rural subculture which differs from the urban subculture making even more difficult their social and cultural integration to the city life.

Migration of people from villages to Korça city and their patterns of social and cultural integration to the host society is the focus of this study. The aim is to highlight the dichotomy rurality-urbanity which characterizes rural to urban migrants.

Korça city remains the second most important destination (besides Tirana) for rural to urban migrants from the southeastern part of the country (Vullnetari J, 2012). Korça is the most important regional pole of the southeast, located along one of the most important trade routes connecting Albania with the Balkans and European countries, through Macedonia and Greece. Korça region has experienced internal and international migration as well. A large number of people have moved from villages to Korça city. Based on statistical data it is estimated that in 2005 the number of people living in Korça city was 85.590 people. In 2005 the number of people moved from villages to Korça city was 2.456 while the number of people who left the city was 1.163. In 2008 the number of people moved to Korça city was estimated 716 people (from which 524 women and 192 men), while the ones left (mainly to Tirana and Greece) were 614 people from which 178 women and 436 men (Statistical Bulletin of Korça 2008). In 2009 the total number of people living in Korça city was 86.596, the number of arrivals was 925 while the number of people who left the city was 572.

Based on statistical indicators from INSTAT regarding the change of residence at district, city or village level, it is estimated that during 2001-2011 the total number of Albanian people who have moved from village to the city was 280,863 individuals. The number of people who have moved to Korca district for the same period (2001-2011) was 6.989 with a prevalence of rural to urban movements (INSTAT 2014). Internal migration during 2001- 2011 is characterized by the displacement of the whole family unit which remains a typical feature of Albanian rural to urban migration.

Migration of people from rural to urban areas brings social and cultural changes to both sending and host communities. This brings into the focus the issue of integration of migrants to the urban subculture.

Albanian rural – to urban migration

Rural to urban migration in context of Albania predominantly affects the whole family. People leave village and move to the city as a whole unit family. Cultural values, norms and traditions of people moved from village to the city face to the ones of urban people and affect the way they integrate to the host society. In Albania context family and family ties are important factors which determine the decision to migrate and the choice of destination as well (Vullnetari 2007). These connections based on family and kin ties which affect the migration patterns creates what is called 'chain migration'. Internal migration in Albanian society often takes place in the form of chain migration. Therefore, social networks based on family and kin ties, financial and social support remain of great importance on integration of rural to urban migrants to the city life. Chain migration leads to the creation of separated social and cultural groups in urban areas. As the number of people that move from village to the city increases, they create their own communities within urban areas, with their own values and lifestyles, that differ from the ones of urban subculture.

Studies on Albanian rural to urban migration show that family and kin ties determine not only the decision to migrate and where to migrate but the housing choice to the country of destination as well. New migrants tend to settle in houses and apartments that are close to the ones of migrants who have moved to the city earlier. This trend of migrants' grouping on the basis of family and kin ties provides to the new migrants who come from village to the city a feeling of continuity of rural lifestyle even while they are living in the city. It is worth mentioning that in a sociological viewpoint terms 'urban culture' and 'rural culture' are considered as relative and conditional mental constructs. The terms 'urban culture' and 'rural culture' refer to a system of values and the lifestyle that characterizes the individuals who live in urban areas and those who live in rural areas, which nowadays are not as separate categories as they used to be in the past. Moving from village to the city brings important changes to the life of internal migrants in terms of education, employment, economic and social opportunities, family relationships, etc. (Rye F, J 2011, King & Skeldon 2010, Vullnetari 2012). Migration studies point out the impact of migration on social and cultural transformation of urban areas due to migrants' efforts to integrate to the host society.

Based on the meaning of 'urban culture' as the way of living in the city and the meaning of 'rural culture' as the way of living in the countryside, it is worth highlighting some characteristics of urban lifestyle compared to rural lifestyle. The city is characterized by heterogeneity. Heterogeneity, social mobility and dynamism of urban life promote flexibility in the way of behaving which leads to more tolerant attitudes. Urban subculture is characterized by more tolerant attitudes towards changes, innovations, recent trends in general. On the other hand, the preservation of tradition and traditional forms of social organization and socially behavior is the most significant feature of rural subculture.

Urban society is mainly characterized by individualism and secondary relationships. It has a more individualized way of living, where people are generally closed within their personal interests, family, work, generally indifferent and sometimes contemptuous of those who come from the countryside (Fuga & Dervishi 2010). In contrast, in rural areas the integration of individuals into the social entity is mainly based on common goals and a common way of living. A typical feature of rural community is a social and cultural system based on family and kin ties which remain strong and decisive for the worldview and lifestyle of people living in rural areas. This is apparently reflected in attitudes, behavior, way of thinking of people living in the village.

Rurality is not only a territorial unit, but derives from socially created meanings (Mormont 1990; cited article. Rye, F. J. 2011:173). The meaning of rurality as a mental category allows us to understand its impact on people actions and attitudes, including both the decision to migrate and the strategies of integration to urban subculture, as well as patterns of social interaction with the host society.

Research Methodology

This paper is part of a wider study regarding internal and international migration in Korça region and its social and cultural impact. Data for this study was provided through a quantitative survey method. 400 surveys were conducted with Albanian migrants moved from villages to Korça city.

Systematic probable sampling was used for the survey of people moved from village to the city. The survey was first piloted on 50 subjects to test the level of clarity and comprehensibility by the respondents. It was statistically tested as well, to prove the accuracy in data distribution and the relationships between the variables. Data provided through the quantitative method (survey) was statistically processed in SPSS program, version 20. For data analysis and interpretation descriptive statistics were used; Pearson's chi-square test to test the relationship between variables; correlational analysis; crosstabulation of data, as well as comparative descriptive analysis to compare the ratio difference between two or more groups of subjects.

Results and Discussion

Indicators of social integration

Integration of rural to urban migrants to urban life represents a complex experience of learning and adapting to a community with new and different subculture (Çaro E, 2011). Despite the changes in lifestyle and modifying cultural values of migrants moved from village to the city due to social integration to urban society, most of them still retain a sense of rurality.

Their tendency to be grouped and localized to the peripheral part of the city creates the possibility for them to share the traditions and norms of the village.

This complies to the assumption of Tittle and Stafford (1992) that people living in the peripheral areas of urban centers are more homogeneous, have strong social boundaries, show less anonymity and fewer aspects of urbanization. In context of our study, it is evident the concentration of rural to urban migrants to the peripheral part of Korça city (mainly section 10, 18) which are dominated by people moved from villages who keep strong family and kin ties and allow them retain a sense of rurality.

Heckmann (2005) identified four types of migrants' integration to the host society including: structural integration (employment, housing, education, access to health services, political rights, etc.); cultural integration (changes in behaviors and attitudes of migrants due to adapting to the norms of the host society); interactive integration and identifying integration (sense of belonging expressed in terms of loyalty to one's own ethnic, local, regional, national identity). Based on this model, it is emphasized that the social dimension of integration of migrants to the country of destination is related to what Heckmann calls interactive integration, which includes social interaction, friendship, intermarriages, membership in various organizations, etc (Heckmann, 2005: 13-15, cited article at King & Skeldon 2010: 1635). The social environment is an important factor that significantly affects the integration of migrants to the host society, as it is related to social interaction between people moved from village to the city and the host society. The local context in which social interactions between migrants and host society occur varies from a number of institutions (administration and public service institutions, schools, companies, hospitals, etc.), to public spaces such as squares, public transport, shops, residential complexes. It also includes the private sphere (family relationships, marriage, friendship) (Gsir, S. 2014). A number of studies show that migrants being surrounded by citizens in their social environment (neighbourhood, work, school, etc.), are more likely to integrate easily to urban life compared to those who are part of a social environment that is mainly dominated by other rural to urban migrants.

Referring to data provided from the survey it is estimated that the results of Pearson's Chi-square test to evaluate the relationship between variable 'social environment in neighbourhood' and variable 'the degree of integration in urban life' showed that there is a statistically significant relationship between the variables:

$$\chi^2 (30, N = 400) = 73.22, p = .000 < .05. \quad (1)$$

Also, the results of Pearson's Chi-square test to evaluate the relationship between variables "social environment at work or school" and "integration in urban life" showed that the relationship is statistically significant:

$$\chi^2 (24, N = 400) = 37.74, p = .037 < .05. \quad (2)$$

These results support the findings of other studies regarding the impact of social interaction on integration of rural to urban migrants to urban life. The workplace/school can be defined as a mixed site (public and private) in terms of everyday contacts and interactions (Amin 2002). On one hand, the workplace/school constitutes a space where dialogue, communication or interactions are mandatory, but on the other hand, it offers opportunities for strengthening social interactions and relations. Being surrounded mainly by townsmen in their workplace or school migrants moved from village to the city appear better integrated in urban life due to frequent social interaction between them.

There are two important factors which affect the degree of social and cultural integration of migrants to the host society; duration of stay in the city and age. Results of Chi-square test showed that there is a statistically significant influence between 'duration of stay in the city' and 'degree of integration in urban life':

$$\chi^2 (308, N = 400) = 373.25, p = .006 < .05 \quad (3)$$

This means that the longer migrants stay in the city, the better integrated they are. On the other hand, results of correlation test between variables 'age' and 'integration to urban life' show that there is a negative association between the two variables. This means that the older migrants who move from village to the city the less integrated to urban life they are. The value of the correlation coefficient shows that the relationship between variables is weak, but statistically significant:

$$r (400) = -.232, p = .00 < .01 \quad (4)$$

This is explained by the fact that integration of people coming from the village to the city is a complex and dynamic process that depends on a number of other factors that co-influence. Social integration leads to greater cultural integration of migrants. The cultural integration of migrants to the host society is related to behavioural changes, changes in attitudes, practices, values, and lifestyle in general. Based on these components of the cultural system, the degree of cultural integration of people moved from village to Korça city has been identified based on the definition of Algan et al (2012) for cultural integration as the measure in which migrants share the same values or behavioural patterns with the rest of the host society. Cultural integration of rural to urban migrants regarding the change in lifestyle, attitudes, behaviour, cultural values is a complex process that occurs over time and in a spatial context. The spatial context is related to the impact of urban social environment and density of social interaction with urban society on the extent of changing lifestyle.

To point out the relationship between urban social environment and social interaction with urban society with the extent of change in lifestyle, Pearson's chi-square test was used.

The variable 'change in lifestyle' was measured through these sub-variables: 'change in mentality', 'change in way of speaking', 'changes in traditions, rituals' and 'changes in family relationship'. The results of the test showed that there is a statistically significant relationship between variables: 'social interaction with urban society' and 'change in lifestyle' of people moved from the village to the city:

$$\chi^2 (120, N = 400) = 164.59, p = .004 < .05 \quad (5)$$

The results of the test also showed a statistically significant relationship between the variable: 'friendship with townsmen' and variable 'change in lifestyle' of people moved from village to Korça city:

$$\chi^2 (60, N = 400) = 102.66, p = .001 < .05 \quad (6)$$

3.2. Links to rural social environment

A number of studies have focused on the impact of migration (internal and external) on the development and emancipation of sending communities, through financial and social remittances (De Haas 2006, 2007; Vullnetari & King, 2003, 2009; Levitt 1998). There are few studies which find that links to country of origin affect not only the transmission of practices, behavior patterns, ideas, and values (acquired during the migratory experience) to the country of origin, but also slow down or hinder the integration of migrants to the host society. Albanian rural to urban migration generally occurs as a family project (INSTAT 2004, Vullnetari 2012). People leave the village and move to the city as a whole family. However, in many cases, young people move to urban space leaving behind their parents and family members (wives and children). Even when migration takes place as a family project, migrants moved to the city leave their relatives or friends in the countryside, maintaining frequent contacts and ties with them.

The continuity of links to rural social environment, through contacts, calls, mutual visits and the density of these connections is an important variable that affects the degree of migrants' integration to the urban subculture. However, it is worth mentioning that links to rural social environment depend on the geographical proximity to Korça city as well as whether those who came from village to the city have left relatives/family members in the village or not.

To point out the impact of links to rural social environment to the integration of migrants moved from village to urban subculture or the extent of maintaining features of rurality while living in the city, we refer to statistical indicators provided from the survey.

The variable 'links to the rural social environment' is a variable created from grouping several other sub-variables (calls to relatives/friends left in the village, mutual visits to relatives/friends in the village).

To measure the level of reliability (internal consistency of scales of the survey), or the extent to which all the statements of a test measure the same concept Cronbach's alpha was calculated (Alpha = .758). This value shows a high internal consistence of test scales. While the variable "rural way of living" was measured through these sub-variables (preserving traditions, rural mentality, way of speaking) (Alpha = 0.582). Results of Chi-square test showed that there is a statistically significant relationship between the continuity of links to rural social environment and maintaining features of the rural lifestyle:

$$\chi^2 (70, N = 400) = 119.95, p = .00 < .05 \quad (7)$$

This indicator supports the assumption that 'continuity of links to rural social environment' impacts preserving the rural way of living.

To test the strength and direction of relationship between the two variables Spearman's Correlation Coefficient was used. Results of Spearman's Correlation showed that there is a positive and weak relationship between the two variables, but statistically significant:

$$r (400) = .268, p = .000 \quad (8)$$

This means that the more frequent and intense links to rural social environment, the greater the tendency to preserve the rural way of living.

3.3. Contacts to the village and the role of tradition

A series of studies on migration and integration of migrants point out that the role of tradition remains stronger even when living in the city among migrants who continue to keep in touch with relatives and friends to the village compared to those who don't (Petkovic 2007, Ozdemir 2003, Vullnetari 2012,

Nikaj 2012). People moving from village to the city are characterized by a strong connection to tradition compared to people living in the city. This is what Petkovic (2007) describes as acceptance of tradition and traditional forms in all parts of social organization and daily behavior of people living in the village. Due to strong ties with family and kin, respect for tradition constitutes a characteristic feature of rural subculture.

This is more evident when it comes to generational expectations.

Living in large family units and sharing a strong sense of community allow people living in the village to share certain values related to obligation to take care of family members and relatives, the sense of responsibility towards them, especially for the elderly, mainly sons to parents.

These attitudes are an expression of patriarchal tendencies of Albanian society, which are more evident in rural areas and remain more stable against changes. Even while living in the city (which is characterized by individualism, autonomy and close family interest) elderly migrants moved from village to urban areas still show the same expectations towards new generation.

Related to this the study showed that there is a positive association between links to rural social environment and preservation of tradition among migrants moved from village to Korça city. Spearman's Correlation Coefficient was used to test the strength and direction of the relationship between the two variables: 'links to rural social environment' and 'remaining the tradition'. Results of the test showed that there is a positive, weak, but statistically significant relationship between the two variables:

$$r(400) = .356, p = .000 < .01 \quad (9)$$

This means that the more frequent the connections to rural environment, the greater the tendency to preserve tradition among migrants moved from village to the city.

The study showed that elderly try to preserve and pass down to the youth certain traditions related to mutual visits between relatives, traditions related to wedding ceremonies, funerals, births, etc. The tendency to maintain these traditions among migrants moved from village to the city is related not only to links with rural social environment, but also to other factors such as migrants' experience, duration of stay in the city, the presence or absence of elderly in the family, etc.

Conclusions

Considering the aim of this paper it is worth mentioning that integration of migrants to urban subculture is closely related to social interaction of them to the host society. Dimensions of social integration include social interaction, friendship, intermarriages, mutual visits etc.

Urban social environment remains a determining factor of social integration as it affects the degree of social interaction between people moved from village to the city and the host society. The study pointed out that social environment in the neighbourhood, workplace, school etc. impact social interaction and integration patterns of migrants to urban life as well.

Results from the study led to the conclusion that rural to urban migrants being surrounded by townsmen in their social environment (neighbourhood, work, school, etc.), appear to be better integrated in urban life.

Urban social environment affects not only the degree of social interaction between migrants and host society but also impacts the type of relationships created between individuals.

The study showed that migrants located in a social environment where there is a large concentration of townsmen are more likely to create close friendly ties with them compared to migrants who live in a social environment dominated by migrants moved from village to the city.

Integration of migrants to the country of destination is a complex process that occurs over time and in a spatial context. The cultural dimension of integration is related to aspects of lifestyle changes. The results of the study showed that coexistence with urban subculture has significantly influenced changes in lifestyle for the vast majority of the respondents. While living in the city migrants begin to adapt to urban lifestyle regarding changes in values, cultural norms, traditions, etc., resembling more and more the host society. An important factor in this context is social interaction to the host society. Data from the survey highlighted the impact of urban social environment on changing the lifestyle of rural to urban migrants. The study founded that in perception of people moved from village to the city changing the lifestyle means improving the material conditions that facilitate their way of living, such as: comfortable house, close distance to work/ school, better conditions at work, more free time, greater opportunities for entertainment, etc. Regarding this, the study showed that while migrants seem to be more included within urban community, they do not appear fully integrated in urban subculture and still maintain a sense of rurality. Their cultural integration is a dynamic and evolving process. The study pointed out some indicators of rurality among people who moved from village to Korça city, such as:

- Strong connection to tradition and norms of the village, mainly influenced by their social concentration in certain parts of the city and the continuity of links to rural community which make it difficult for them to create a clear urban identity
- Lack of trust towards townsmen reflected by the tendency to maintain and strengthen social networks based on family and kin ties
- Too much care and concern on the way their actions or behaviors are being perceived by the rest of the population, especially by townsmen.

Integration and social inclusion should not be considered as stable situations or given facts, but as dynamic social processes which often operate through contradictory mechanisms. On one hand there are forces and mechanisms which push migrants towards inclusion, on the other hand there are personal strategies, informal social networks that facilitate their integration to the host society. Duration of stay in the country of destination remains of particular importance in this sense. The longer migrants live in the city the stronger and more complete is their integration to urban society. The study also showed that young people moved from village to the city are more willing to adapt and integrate to the host society, while the elderly are more willing to isolate within the migrants' community.

Regarding the above findings and conclusions reached it is worth mentioning that a whole understanding of migrants' integration to urban society lays the need for further research regarding personal sources and individual characteristics of migrants as well as migrants' social network. Integration to the host society is not only a function of material and social resources, or duration of stay, but also a matter of individual characteristics: readiness, feelings, mutual perceptions, etc. The way people perceive each other affects the extent to which they interact. These perceptions become a source of labeling and prejudicing which directly affect the degree of social interaction between migrants and host society. Another important variable which must be taken into consideration in this context is related to the social networks of migrants. Social networks facilitate the process of adaptation and integration of migrants to the host society. It is recommended to study the impact of migrants' social network on their integration to the country of destination as well as identifying whether they are 'urban' social network or rural kin- based social network. Next, furthering the research on internal migration will demand better understanding of gender dimensions of migration process. Migration patterns and integration of women migrants to urban society should be another priority area for future research.

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Economic and social consequences of emigration on home country: Albania Case

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Abstract

Although more than thirty years have passed, migration has been a dynamic process. Sometimes Albanians see emigration from Albania as the best solution, but which is the impact of emigration on Albania? Many different studies have been analyzed the economic and social consequences of emigration on the countries of origin. Mostly migration can generate positive effect for countries of origin via benefit from remittances, reduction of unemployment, migrants often bring home new ideas, skills, and knowledge that they have acquired. But migration can also generate negative effect for countries of origin. So, the most negative impact on the country is the fact that young or skilled labor and professional leave to offer their services to other countries. High future migration potential and low birth rates will lead to a shrinking population and labor force, a changing age structure, and a decrease in the quality of human capital (Gëdeshi, I. & King, R., 2018). This paper aims to analyze the consequences brought by the continuous phenomenon of emigration of Albanians, both in economic and social aspects.

Keywords: migration, economic consequences, social consequences, Albania

JEL Classification: F 22, F 240, P 2

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
At the beginning of the 90s, Albania faced the change of the economic system, from the centralized economy to the to the market economy. During this time, Albania also faced the great desire of people to emigrate abroad for a better life. The first emigration wave is the period 1991-1992. In the summer of 1990, about 5,000 Albanians entered the embassies in Tirana, and in August 1991, about 20,000 Albanians left the country by boat to Italy. During the period December 1996 - April 1997, Albania faced another wave of emigration. As a result of the collapse of the corrupt financial pyramid schemes in 1997 (where most Albanians lost their savings)

the country was engulfed by political-social unrest. During this period, Albanians saw emigration to other languages as a problem of their problems.

In his article (Barjaba, 2004) states that around 30 percent of Albanians are currently below the poverty line, and half of them live in extreme poverty, subsisting on less than \$1 per day. For this reason, the main factors that push Albanians to emigrate are unemployment, poor living conditions, lack of individual security and political security (De Sotto et al., 2002). From 1989 to 2001, about 710,000 people, or 20 percent of the total population, emigrated from Albania, mainly to Greece and Italy and less to other countries. After 1998, the emigration flows suffered a significant decrease. But, with the liberalization of visas in 2010, Albanians had the opportunity to move to the countries of the Schengen area. By (Kule *et al.* 2002) emigration pressures are likely to remain very strong in Albania for the foreseeable future, driven mostly by economic forces.

In the study of (Gëdeshi, I. & King, R., 2018) it was observed that 52% of the Albanian population of the 18-40 age group want to migrate from Albania, compared to the 2007 survey, where 44.2% of this age group wanted to emigrate. According to (Gëdeshi, I. & King, R., 2018) aspects related to economic conditions, working conditions, low wages, lack of perspective are important factors that drive people to migrate for a better life and future.

Figure 1: The trend of emigration in Albania



Source: INSTAT, 2023

During 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the restrictive measures that were taken in all countries, the number of people emigrating decreased significantly. But,

with the removal of the restrictive measures, we noticed a significant increase in the number of immigrants. What is noticed now is that if at the beginning of the 90s, the majority of potential migrants were the unemployed, the unskilled and the uneducated, who were mainly driven by the difficult economic conditions they were in, now it is noticed that people who want to emigrate are all those who have different skills, people with higher education or people with high incomes. But what are the reasons that encourage this category to emigrate? By Gwdeshi.I, people want to leave because they see no future in Albania.¹ Hope for a better future and prospects in host countries are key pull factors influencing international migratory experiences. The perspectives sought range from education, employment, to the overall quality of life for the individual migrant and his or her family. (King & Vullnetari, 2003)

In the article (Zisi, A, et al 2022) factor “*Future in Albania*” shows that 75% of the sample taken in the study think they would solve this factor as a reason for leaving Albania. The security they seek for the future encourages young Albanians to leave as young people perceive this factor to be very important. The difficulties they face make them skeptical about their future employment in Albania and see emigration to developed countries as a solution.

The positive impact of migration on Albanian economy

Benefit from remittances

Emigration has played an important role in the economic development of the country, mainly in alleviating poverty and reducing unemployment over the years. According to (Katseli et al., 2018) migration can generate positive effect for countries of origin as remittances, reduction of unemployment, human capital accumulation, return migration etc. According to (Ratha, 2003), remittances are among the largest flows of external financing for developing countries.

One of the most positive impacts of immigration on the Albanian economy has been remittances, the income that immigrants have sent to their families for a better life. According to a survey by the Bank of Albania (2007), it is estimated that about 26% of families in the territory of the Republic of Albania benefit from remittances from abroad. In the early 90s, remittances were mainly used to meet the basic needs of families, but over the years their use has changed. Now most of the beneficiary families use the remittances to improve their living conditions, for investments at home or in business, in children's education, etc. As such, remittances have a positive impact on the welfare of families and the country as a whole (OECD, 2006).

Mainly, immigrants' remittances have been through formal channels such as: Bank, Western Union, Money Gram, etc., or informal channels: income brought by friends,

¹ <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-albania-migration-trends/albania-migration-trends-change-52-percent-mull-leaving-idUSKCN1MT2HF>

family, etc. During the years 1992-1996, it is noticed that remittances have been increasing; during 1997, remittances fell due to the bankruptcy of various pyramid schemes and from 1999-2008 an increase in remittances from immigrants. In 2004 remittances reached over 1 billion dollars, representing between 10 and 22 percent of the country's GDP, and exceeding several times the amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the country (Volunteer, 2007). Regarding the period 2014 - 2017, the impact of remittances on economic growth is estimated at the level of 0.2 percentage points for an average economic growth of 2.8% Maintaining growth rates or at least remittance flow levels is very important (Bank of Albania, 2018).

Figure 2: Personal remittances, received (% of GDP)- Albania



Source: World Bank,2023

Knowledge and skills flow

Mostly, migrants often bring home new ideas, skills, and knowledge that they have acquired. They usually return with savings, useful skills and contacts which help to establish a business and to increase innovation for their country of origin. Many businesses, farm practices, and economic ventures have been started by people who got ideas and knowledge during the times they spent in migration.

In their survey (Kule *et al.* 2002) provide evidence that the proportion of remittances invested in productive activities appears to be modest. The results from the firm survey provide a better understanding of the importance of remittances for job creation (Skills and contacts acquired abroad are useful on return), and more

generally of the value of emigration for Albania. The study undertaken by INSTAT and IOM showed that during the period 2009–2013, 133,544 Albanian emigrants returned to Albania, where 34 percent of the returned migrants were employed, 20 percent were self-employed, and 46 percent were unemployed (INSTAT, IOM 2014).

The negative impact of migration on Albanian economy

Loss of skilled labor

The most negative impact of emigration on home country is the fact that skilled labor and professional leave to offer their services to other countries. When countries are experiencing high levels of migration, the young population of that country (country of origin) will not be able to provide their previous level of economic contributions. This can result in a significant loss of wealth to the country as a whole. The socio-economic consequences of this phenomenon are clearly evident: every year, qualified human and financial resources leaves the country (Gëdeshi, I and King, R 2018).


Mostly young educated people have emigrated and their leaving reduces the productive labor force in the countries of origin. In Albania, in most cases, educated young people or qualified workers, like doctors, nurses, engineers, and very bright professionals, face high unemployment or very low wages. The loss of creative capital is one of the negative consequences, which becomes significant in cases of the emigration of young people because they represent the source of future innovation, production, and ideas (Jevtović, N. 2020). The educational system also does not meet the requirements of the labor market. These problems impact negatively on human capital and increase the desire of young people to emigrate for a better life (Mara, I. and Vidovic, H 2020).

Population

Albania is currently growing very slowly, with a growth rate of just 0.34%. According to the Institute of Statistics (INSTAT), the population of Albania on January 1, 2022 was 2,793,592 residents. The population has decreased by 1.3%, compared to the previous period January 1, 2021. During the year 2021, the natural increase of the population (birth-death) was -3,296, marking for the first time a negative natural increase. As can be seen from the graph below, the annual population growth rate has been decreasing year after year. Over this period, it is expected that the net migration will remain negative, but steady and that the decrease in numbers will be due to the increasing gap between the low birth rate and high death rate¹.

Figure 3: Annual population growth rate

¹ <https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/albania-population>



Source: INSTAT, 2022

In Albania the combination of high emigration of young qualified people, low return migration, high future migration potential and low birth rates will lead to a shrinking population (Gëdeshi, I and King, R 2018).

Social/Family

Emigration, as a continuous process in our country, has been associated with both positive and negative impacts. During the last years, the process of emigration is giving powerful demographic and socio-economic consequences, such as the emptying of the country, the aging of the population, the decrease in the number of births etc¹.

The most negative impact that emigration has brought to Albanian society is the social and family impact that accompanies all families that have one or more members in emigration.

Many Albanian sociologists and psychologists argue that immigration carries serious socio-economic consequences. The UNICEF study in 2009 identified 4,290 children with one or both parents in emigration. The separation of the family for a long time and the absence of the father in raising children is associated with negative effects. Children who live with one parent (when the other parent is emigrating) manifest emotional problems, anxiety and depression, at higher levels than children who live with both parents. Also, another social problem that emigration shows is the increase in the number of people living alone. According to psychologist A. Muçaj, the psychological impact on parents is very large, because it is related to their emotional well-being and to the fact that the elderly need both emotional and financial support².

Conclusion and suggestion

¹ Tushi, G. (2019, June 14). Ekspertët: Nga Shqipëria po ikin njerëzit me standard jetese. Deutsche Welle

² <https://shqiptarja.com/lajm/përse-emigrojnë-shqiptarët>

If at the beginning of the 90s, Albanians emigrated mainly for economic reasons, in recent years there has been an increase in the number of people who want to emigrate even though they have a good income, are highly educated, and have a good standard of living. etc. The reduction of the population due to emigration, the aging of the population, the decrease in the number of births, etc., bring negative impacts on the Albanian economy.

The solution lies in equipping young people with education and qualification according to market needs. Necessity is the restructuring of the education system, taking into account the demands or needs of the market for different professions. If young people leave mainly for a better life in developed countries, then there is a need to improve the business climate as well as to increase the level of wages in order for everyone to ensure a good standard of living.

The mass emigration that appeared especially after 2020 is accompanied by disturbing problems, therefore the government's intervention is seen as necessary to minimize this phenomenon. Governments should aim constantly to improve the business climate by simplifying the tax system, reforming the banking sector, reducing bureaucracy, and eliminating waste and corruption in the public sector. The return of emigrants and the redirection of remittances to productive activities can be greatly facilitated by investment incentives provided through the tax and banking system (Kule *et al.* 2002)

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Contemporary Left-Wing Populism and Right-Wing Populism, and Inclusions and Exclusions: from Europe, Latin America, to the Middle East and North Africa

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Extended Abstract

From a comparative perspective, the study examines current left-wing and right-wing political behaviour and inclusionary and exclusionary practices in MENA, Latin America, and Europe and its outcomes on political developments and changes. This study investigates the evolution and transition of contemporary rightism and leftism in these dissimilar Regions and the diverse degrees of inclusionary and inclusionary populism features of the political parties. First, it questions political conditions, behavioralism, and transitions of populism. Second, in which forms of inclusions and exclusions populism arrive on the political scene. The focus is on the latest decade from the cross-continental and cross-regional perspective. Although there is scholarly debate about contemporary populism in the European Continent (in general) and, lately, some in Latin America and MENA (Middle East and North Africa), cross-continental and regional research is lacking. Various research suggests that populism differs. Some are tasks of regeneration or democratisation; others are movements that would weaken democracy by promoting the rebirth of nationalism and politics of exclusion (fascism, xenophobia, racism, radical nationalism). Thus, the former is left-wing populism, while the latter is right-wing populism. Moreover, populism and corporatism are examined from a comparative cross-continental and cross-regional perspective. Although there is scholarly debate about contemporary populism in the European Continent (in general) and, lately, some in Latin America and MENA (Middle East and North Africa), cross-continental and regional research is lacking. The facts are the rise of exclusionary radical populism in Europe and inclusionary populism in Latin America. Regardless, some exceptions exist, including inclusionary radical left populism (e.g. Greece, or exclusionary left-wing populism (e.g. B&H, social-democratic by

name and by position centre simultaneously left-wing and right-wing). In MENA, populism varies between right-wing and left-wing, with a category of security populism in Israel and Islamic Populism in much of the Islamic world. Populism processes in MENA, a region within (semi) democratic or authoritarian regimes, between parliamentary or presidential systems and enforced by external geopolitical agents and aspirations, are broader and part of a complex global geopolitical context. The politics in the postcolonialism conditions (Latin America) more often contain populism. It sees populism as a contemporary and collective political response to the global crisis of nation-state approaches due to globalisation and the stronghold of capitalism. The world is becoming increasingly characterised by populism, inclusionary or exclusionary. Common sense voting behaviour worldwide is under populist invasion, left and right-wing. The motivating force and practice of the populists are the (self-proclaimed) protection of (ethnic) national identities, socio-cultural values, or religion. Populist often builds their programs on the suppression and denial of analytical facts and various exclusions (more nominal inclusions) by resurrecting the socio-political concepts and ideals of outdated nationwide sovereignty.

Keywords: MENA, Latin America, Europe, Populism, Left-wing, Rightwing, Inclusions, Exclusions, Political Behaviour

Introduction

Interestingly, in its beginnings, populism was exclusively linked to the left-wing political movement, particularly in the USA, where it embodied the struggle for the rights of peasants and workers and criticised a system favouring the elites' interests. Populism spread throughout Europe after the Second World War (WW2), and the systematic treatment of this term only began in the 1960s. Interest in the populism concept continued in the 1990s when political movements that analysts labelled as right-wing populism grew in several European countries. At the same time, some researchers continue the tradition started in the 1960s and focus on detailed descriptions of individual populist movements, which results in case studies, but without any attempt to make the knowledge gained by them theoretical at all. On the contrary, the second part of the researchers builds on Margaret Canovan's study from the 1980s, starting from the thesis that populism as a phenomenon is not a universal concept and does not contain a common core. The best researchers have been doing is creating a typology of populist movements. Populism is characterised by faith in popular wisdom and virtue, rejection of traditional political elites and their

institutions, and preference for direct forms of democracy. It is an ideology that opposes a unique and moral people to elites and dangerous others who, with joint forces, take away (or try to) the sovereign people's rights and values. Thus, populism as an ideology which emerged and grew in Western Europe is primarily a reaction to the failure of traditional parties to adequately respond in the eyes of voters to several different phenomena, such as economic and cultural globalisation, the speed of European integration, immigration, and elite corruption. (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008) However, I maintain that populism is not necessarily only an anti-establishment movement. Also, populism contains socio-political and cultural elements that differ between various types of populism. Francis Fukuyama noted that the rise of populism is fueled by globalisation and the consequent increase in inequality in rich countries (Fukuyama, 2019).

Populism, globally, whether right-wing or left-wing, exclusionary or inclusionary, represents the genesis of a multi-layered phenomenon. Although populism today has a negative connotation and is placed on the right side of the political spectrum, populist policies can be both right and left. Philippe Roger points out that populism encompasses a set of complex ideas, experiences and practices that do not fit into any typology. Populist leaders often propose "common sense" solutions and stigmatise minority groups (political, financial, and sometimes ethnic) that monopolise power. Populism combines the themes of nationalism and xenophobia, advocates for the protection of vulnerable sections of the people and often encourages reflexes that should bring about the security of the nation and the state. Michel Winock points out that "populism is not a specific phenomenon of the extreme right". The word "populism" primarily means "trust in the people", a concept we find in Robespierre and Michelet. In South America, populism denoted some political regimes such as Peronism in Argentina, then the regimes of Getúli Vargas in Brazil and Lázár Cárdenas in Mexico. What the media superficially calls right-wing or xenophobic populism belongs to the family of "national populism". Namely, this term often appears in journalistic jargon and was introduced in the 70s of the 20th century by the Argentine sociologist Gino Germani, who thus denotes the nationalist and populist regimes of South America between 1930 and 1950. The term was later adopted by a French political scientist and historian, Pierre-André Taguieff, who calls it a form of populism of the National Front in France. According to Taguieff's opinion, populism is first of all - before being defined as left or right - a political discourse that is articulated around the central term "appeal to the people". Populism tends to stigmatise the dominant establishment and corrupt elites, rising above the traditional left-right dichotomy. Taguieff, however, points out that some far-right political parties have somewhat turned into national populist movements that combine old right-wing themes with new populist themes such as security, social protection, immigration and Islamophobia. (Vujic, 2018)

What are the ideologues of left populism? Chantal Mouffe contributed significantly with the book *Pour un populisme de Gauche* and Ernesto Laclau, who ideologically

and politically articulated left populism. Namely, once reserved for initiated university circles of social sciences, their theories of critical populism and radical democracy found a place in public and political life and the mainstream media. Their theory, which Antonio Gramsci significantly influenced, is defined as post-Marxist because they distanced themselves from the economic determinism and class essentialism characteristic of Marx's thought. Articulating three key concepts (discourse, antagonism and hegemony), Laclau and Chantal Mouffe present a social emancipation theory, depriving the working class of its privileged historical status in classical Marxist theory, especially within infrastructures and production relations. In other words, contemporary conflicts and political struggles are no longer the product of infrastructures and production relations but rather the result of the contingent articulation of heterogeneous wills in society. Their concept of radical democracy and populism is based on such theoretical postulates. Within such a perspective of radical democracy, it is essential to accept the inevitability of conflict in the democratic arena. Radical democracy is more a practice than a regime or an institutional arrangement, and it assumes a "continuous process of construction; deconstruction; reconstruction". In this direction, populism is nothing but the very logic inherent in the phenomenon of political conflict. In the field of political ideas, along with Mouffe and Laclau, there are theorists of heterodox post-Marxism who try to influence the ideological profiling of left-wing populism, such as Robert Kurz, Moishe Postone, Anselm Jappe, Cornelius Castoriadis and Enzo Travers. They contrast "exoteric Marx" (classical Marxism, theories of industrial modernisation, labor-centered theories and superficial market analysis) with "esoteric Marx" (which is less well known in the form of value and commodity criticism). (Vujic, 2018)

Populist actors worldwide have gradually evolved into influential political forces in various countries and regions. According to Huber and Schimpf (2017), independent of the region, they share the ideas of anti-elitism and people centrism. On this basis, they can challenge standard democratic rules, including those of liberal democracy (Plattner, 2010), according to which power must be restrained and individual rights protected. Through the populist lens, features of liberal democracy, such as systems of checks and balances, undermine the proper implementation of the general will, which they claim to be the only true representative of. Thus, their presence can hurt the quality of democracy if populist parties challenge these institutions, mainly when they are in government. Populist parties, however, are not only characterised by their populist element but also by their host ideology. Thus, they can be right-wing populist parties, left-wing, or centrist. In other words, populist parties differ on wide-ranging issues, such as promoting exclusive (right-wing populist parties) or inclusive (left-wing populist parties) societies. These differences have been shown to manifest themselves in the behaviour of populist parties, for instance, in parliamentary voting, where the populist element plays little to no role. Despite these well-known differences, there is little debate in the literature about whether the postulated

relationship between populist parties and democracy is a function of their host ideology, their populist element, or both. (Huber & Schimpf, 2017)

Populism, regardless of whether it is left or right, contains the practical and political behaviour forms (as well as dichotomies) of inclusion, exclusion, authoritarianism, non-authoritarianism, intense nativism, weak nativism, radical democratic populism, conspiratorial populism and others. The qualitative analysis of populist parties (in Europe) usually shows that right-wing populist parties are characterised as exclusive and authoritarian with intense nativism and conspiratorial populism. They always tend to oppose immigration and, thus, multiculturalisation. Also, besides migration, recently, rightists have adopted more extreme rhetoric and policy positions on climate change and LGBTQ rights. Left populist parties are characterised as inclusive and non-authoritarian, with weak nativism and a radical democratic approach. Illiberal populist parties are characterised as exclusive parties with intense nativism and conspiratorial populism. Anti-establishment parties are characterised as non-authoritarian with weak nativism and a radical democratic approach. Worryingly, an analysis by more than 100 political scientists in 31 countries found that in European national elections in 2022, 32 per cent of European voters voted for anti-establishment parties, compared with 20 per cent in the early 2000s and 12 per cent in the early 1990s. (Henley, 2023)

The Brexit referendum and Donald Trump's election in 2016 marked the breakthrough of right-wing populism in the West. Opposition to immigration has arguably been central to both events. There is a relationship between populist radical-right parties and immigration, comparing differences across the Atlantic. Immigration has been central to nationalist populist discourse in Europe for many years. This has been accentuated by the immigration crisis on Europe's Eastern border that began around July 2021. Definitions are relevant to the debate, so it is first necessary to differentiate the discourse from the actual level of immigration. Immigrants are a population already within the country, whereas immigration designates the "flow" from point A to B. As the flow increases, the presumption is that PRR support also increases. Nevertheless, a counterexample to this was the burkini ban issue in France. The ban had little to do with immigration and border crossing but rather with immigrants already present coming from different cultural backgrounds. For the PRR, immigration has not only translated into control by the state over its borders but subsequently also into a danger to the "nation".

Immigration has become highly nationalistic - a contradiction in the European Union (EU) context. Immigration encounters resistance from those who have immigrated from outside the EU and from those who have migrated within it. Incidents of Islamic terrorism have sometimes involved first and second-generation immigrants and have been used by the PRR to mobilise political support. For instance, anti-immigrant attitudes in the UK have to do with immigrants coming from other parts of the Union (Polish plumbers). Immigrants (whether Muslims from the Middle East and North

Africa, Romani from Eastern Europe in France, or Caribbeans in the UK) represent "the Other" for the PRR. This, in turn, ties into the question of identity, which bears significant political importance. The immigration question shapes the way nations view themselves; it was notably at the core of the Brexit vote. The immigration debate also differs from country to country. In France, the focus has always been on North African immigration and much less on immigration from Syria (a country of concern for others).

Two dynamics limit the prospect for growth of PRR parties. First, ambition for power is often linked to deradicalisation (as the Italian Lega and the French National Front (FN) tried a decade ago), which can unsuccessfully lead to party splits. Even when this reorientation is successful, participation in governing power has tended to reduce, not increase, their electoral support (as with the Freedom Party of Austria, FPÖ). Second, as this electoral support grows, so does the strength of electoral opposition that seeks to block them from gaining seats or forming coalitions. Electoral support for Rassemblement National (RN) in France peaked between 2017 and 2019 and is likely to diminish in 2022, with a challenge from its right in Eric Zemmour. Alternative for Germany (AfD) in Germany has not increased its electoral support since 2017; Vox in Spain has not increased its support since 2019. Electoral support for radical right parties in Denmark, Norway and Greece has declined recently. Structure matters. As the case of the US demonstrates, federalism and localism can sustain radical right parties in local fiefs and protect them even if their support at the national level does not grow or even diminishes. (Shain, 2021)

Dani Filc argues that populism is too complex to fit easily into the conventional political dimensions of left and right. Mattia Zulianello and Petra Guasti argue that populism is either left-wing or right-wing is a myth. They support their claim by describing two sub-groups of populism that do not fit the left-right dichotomy: valence and agrarian populism. Their conceptualisation of valence populism as a non-ideological populism is also enlightening! Their argument is important because it stresses the complexity and variety of populist movements. There are, after all, populist movements that are both left- and right-wing. Peronism is one of the most longstanding populist movements, reaching government in five different historical periods after 1945. It had strong right and left wings, making it difficult to classify as either. Technopopulism, as Christopher Bickerton and Carlo Invernizzi-Accetti analysed, is yet another phenomenon that cannot be easily classified as left or right. More generally, considering populism as either left-wing or right-wing is problematic because the differentiation between left and right is less straightforward now than in the past. Norberto Bobbio offers us a way to differentiate between left and right based on each approach to equality. He argued that leftists believe that human beings are equal, that inequalities are a social product, and that social practices and policies should aim to increase equality. Those on the right, meanwhile, believe that social inequalities are the unavoidable result of natural inequalities concerning gender, ethnicity, race, nationality, or class. However, when discussing whether specific

political parties are left-wing or right-wing, we should consider their stands along three axes. These are economic structure and policies, cultural and identity issues, and the conceptualisation of democracy. There certainly are political parties that are wholly left or wholly right wing, but many, including populist parties, mix characteristics. The crux of inclusion or exclusion among populist parties seems to be how they define 'the people', but populist inclusion can never be absolute. (Filc, 2023)

The host ideology, focusing on left- and right-wing populism, has consequences for how these parties relate to the dimension of political inclusion and minority rights. However, we expected the host ideology to be irrelevant to a populist party's association with mutual constraints. The empirical findings support an argument that populism should not be examined in isolation from its host ideology when considering the relationship between populist actors and democracy. This finding should not diminish populism's role in this relationship, particularly in the wake of temporary developments in cases such as Poland and Hungary. In some cases, however, populism may matter less or even only constitute an additional qualifier of radical right parties rather than being a steady feature. Future studies thus could explore under which conditions ideology and populism may play a more significant role for populist parties and how they relate to specific aspects of democracy, an issue in which fundamental differences in historical legacies between East- and West-Europe may well play into (Gherghina & Soare, 2013). Also, right-wing populist parties have been shown to mobilise certain voter groups neglected by other political parties, such as citizens who are less educated or poor (e.g., Huber & Ruth, 2017; Rooduijn, 2017). At the same time, they may also discourage sure voters from turning out in elections (Immerzeel & Pickup, 2015). By focusing on the dimension of political participation, future research may explore whether left-wing populist parties exert similar effects or whether mobilisation and de-mobilization effects depend on a populist party's host ideology. (Huber and Scimpf, 2017)

There is a significant difference between the two types of populism. Left-wing movements usually express inclusionary populism. It is combined with progressive patriotism, while exclusionary populism is expressed by extreme right-wing parties and is associated with nationalism. Inclusionary populism also allows for the political integration of marginalised and excluded people, thus expanding the boundaries of democracy. Exclusionary populism understands the people as an ethnically or culturally homogeneous unit and excludes people (migrants, minorities, etc.) on the grounds of racist and nativist reasons. Latin-American and South European populism are mostly inclusive and egalitarian (socioeconomic dimension), while North American and North European populism are principally exclusionary and hierarchical in profile (sociocultural dimension). (Markou, 2016) Applied to practical politics, extreme or radical nationalists believe that the country should be a culturally homogenous entity and that the state should reflect the cultural values of its people. As such, radical nationalism is often against universal international law.

Regions, where Colonialism occurred are very often strongholds of the development of either form of populism. Inclusionary populism allows for the political integration of excluded social groups and people, thus enlarging the boundaries of democracy. It is crucial to note that Latin-American and South European populisms are mostly inclusive and egalitarian. In contrast, North American and North European populisms are principally exclusionary and hierarchical in profile. Inclusive populism appears mostly in colonised countries and regions (such as Latin America) where the people are constituted by including different ethnic and social groups.

On the contrary, exclusionary populism appears mainly in former colonialist countries (such as North Europe) because its nativism is that of the coloniser (and its ethnocentrism produces a racist discourse). Left-wing populist movements do not necessarily involve nationalism and xenophobia, as is demonstrated by their anti-racist orientation. However, it is possible to utilise progressive patriotism, a sense of pride in a culturally or territorially defined community. Patriotism is usually defined as the persistence of love or loyalty to a country and is distinguished from xenophobia or hatred of others. Patriotism taps the affective component of one's feelings toward one's country, while nationalism reflects a perception of national superiority and an orientation toward national dominance. (Markou, 2017)

Aim and Methodology

Thus, the study examines right-wing and left-wing in various Continents and Regions: MENA, Latin America, and Europe. First, it questions political conditions, behavioralism, and transitions of populism. Second, in which forms of inclusions and exclusions populism arrive on the political scene. Thus, the focus is the latest decade of the contemporary world (diverse Continents and Regions: MENA, Latin America, and Europe). Although there is scholarly debate about contemporary populism in the European Continent (in general) and, lately, some in Latin America and MENA (Middle East and North Africa), cross-continental and regional research is lacking. This research review incorporated the scientific methodology of meta-analysis, content analysis, a descriptive method, and an in-depth literature review. It included examining various scientific, professional, and expert-based data formats.

Discussion and Results

1) Europe

The financial crisis of 2008 caused growing frustrations about the failure to solve social problems, creating fertile ground for reconfiguring the political scene. New non-systemic movements criticise the sterile policy of economic reforms, emerging like the Greek Aganaktismenoi movement, the Spanish Movimiento 15-M or the French Nuit. On the other hand, the traditional lines of division and political antagonism between the right and the left are becoming weaker in the face of new political configurations, where there is a confrontation between the "radical centre", which seeks to defend the neoliberal agenda through pragmatic reformism, and

"populism" with ideologically different inspirations is a common feature in that, in a certain sense, they dualise the social space into members of the people and elite-oligarchy. For example, in Greece, the popularity of the social democratic PASOK was significantly reduced in favour of the left-wing populist party Syriza. In Spain, the demise of the social-democratic PSOE opened the way for a new configuration with a new triangular distribution of power between the centre-right, left-wing populism Podemos and PSOE. In Italy, a triangular scheme is also at work between the fragmented right, the left centre and the populist party Five Star Movement, which is vaguely defined from an ideological point of view but with a clear anti-migration mood. In France, Macron's movement seeks to unite the centre-left and centre-right against Marine Le Pen's populist National Front. Today, in addition to the criticism of the dominant corrupt elites, the migration crisis has also become a powerful lever of the cultural-identity discourse of national populism, but also, by the back door, of left-wing populism. (Vujic, 2018)

In Europe, there is no general association between populist parties and democracy, independent of their status (government or opposition). While the anticipated direction of correlation is negative for populists in government and favourable for those actors in opposition, they are not statistically significant. However, a different picture emerges when distinguishing populist parties according to their host ideology:

The rightwing populist parties are associated with lower-quality liberal democracy.

Centre and left-wing populist parties are associated with a higher quality of liberal democracy.

While the centre and left-wing populist parties are statistically different from right-wing populist parties, there is no significant difference between those two categories.

These findings provide a first idea about potential differences in the association between populist parties and liberal democracy due to varying host ideologies. (Huber and Scimpf, 2017)

European populist parties in government are not associated with any particular direction regarding minority rights. In contrast, populist opposition parties are associated with a positive development. However, considering host ideology, we find this does not apply to all populists equally. For minority rights, we expected a more negative effect of right-wing populist parties and a positive influence of left-wing populist parties compared to the absence of populist parties. The empirical results lend support to our argument. First, on average, we observe a substantial positive relationship between left-wing populist parties and minority rights, whereas we find adverse effects for right-wing populist parties. The presence of centrist populist parties is neither negatively nor positively correlated with minority rights. (Huber and Schimpf, 2017)

Migrations are central to Europe's future, security, and identity. The EU's cultural integrity remains unclear, and the migrant crisis opens up a multiculturalism discourse. The nation-state model has undergone significant globalised world changes, becoming less sustainable and less critical for cultural, political, and economic processes. Due to the growing economic insecurity and the fear of losing national identities in an environment of globalised culture, some have perceived multiculturalism as a threat. The humanitarian and security discourse reflects the micro-level of the situation on the ground and the mass media's macro levels and political action. Acceptance of ethno-religious or political diversity does not relieve immigrants of the duty to recognise all the rules necessary to conduct productive coexistence. Migrants' participation in socio-economic and political systems means realising the preconditions for the beginning of cultural integration. The crisis triggered an avalanche of anti-Islam sentiments that became a reference matrix for radical populism. The sense of identification with the housing society - Bosniaks, where Islamic regulations on the matrix are legitimised by recognising a universal theological pattern, is a symbolic moment and a participative approach to understanding religion and integration. Constructing immigrants as a group, whether they are migrants, refugees, or asylum seekers, tends to encourage the perception that "their "interests, values, and traditions are competing with "ours, "stimulating negative emotions in the form of prejudice. (Hadzic, 2020)

Matthijs Rooduijn and Tjitske Akkerman showed how populism is distributed over the political spectrum and questioned whether right-wing parties are more populist than left-wing parties. The analysis of 32 parties in five Western European countries between 1989 and 2008 showed that radical parties on both the left and the right are inclined to employ a populist discourse. This is a striking finding because populism in Western Europe has typically been associated with the radical right; only some particular radical left parties have been labelled populist as well. This article suggests that the contemporary extreme left in Western Europe is generally populist. Many contemporary radical left parties are not traditionally communist or socialist (anymore). They do not focus on the 'proletariat' but glorify a more general category: the 'good people'. Moreover, they accept the system of liberal democracy as such but only criticise the political and economic elites within that system. (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2015)

Right-wing populists share the characteristics of authoritarianism, nativism and populism, but the comparison revealed significant differences on the economic dimension and in determining "dangerous others". The French National Rally (RN) party has left-wing socio-economic views and advocates for the protection of gender equality and sexual minorities who, according to them, are threatened by Islamist fundamentalism. Therefore, they include the Muslim religious minority and Muslim immigrants in the "dangerous others". The Norwegian right-wing populists gathered in the Progressive Party (FrP) are positioned to the right on the economic dimension, meaning they are neoliberal. Still, just like the National Front, they emphasise that

they protect sexual minorities from Muslims as "dangerous others". In addition, they oppose positive discrimination against the Sami (Laps). Right-wing populists in the new democracies exclude sexual minorities and ethnic minorities from their concept of the people. Consequently, sexual minorities, ethnic minorities and Muslim immigrants appear as "dangerous others". The Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS) is also against abortion. While for the Czech party Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD), the EU represents "dangerous others", which is why they propose a referendum on membership in the Union, Law and Justice (PiS) shows soft Euroscepticism and a reluctance to cooperate with the Russians, unlike Freedom and Direct Democracy (SDP). The National Gathering (RN) opposes the current European integration processes. It proposes a referendum on membership or at least fundamental changes in the functioning of the EU. In addition, they agree with Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) on the need for cooperation with the Russian authorities. (Maravic, 2019)

Thus, in recent years, Europe has seen a steady growth of populism, which should be seen as a symptom of the very crisis of the legitimacy of representative democracy and the disruption of relations between the people and the political elites, who are moving away and settling comfortably in distant structures of political and economic power. The populist political phenomenon is flatly classified as far right, even though the sources and forms of populist thought can also be found on the left. However, there should be the shifting of new political divisions and the necessity of reinterpreting outdated binary political paradigms and typologies. The emergence of left-wing populism maintains the deficit and defeat of the systemic left, that is, social democracy, which failed the original goals of defending workers and fighting against capital. By embracing the rules of the market game and the ideology of "individual desire", the civil left has separated itself from the people. It does not share their true aspirations and needs. The emergence of left-wing populism could signify the rebirth of socialism that would be faithful to its original principles. It should also not be forgotten that Karl Marx condemned unfair competition and saw how dangerous immigration was for the survival of the "indigenous proletariat." According to him, immigration is a "reserve army of capital". In conclusion, it should be said that left populism is possible only by distancing oneself from the dogmatic historical determinism of Marx but also from abstract internationalism and globalism as the legitimising discourse of the ideology of the neoliberal market. In this regard, the left-wing critic of Jean-Claude Miché points out that "globalisation is nothing but the planetary extension of deterritorialised and speculative capitalism, which costs the most and endangers nations." (Vujic, 2018)

Populism implies a constant conflict between elite, establishment, and alienated structures linked to interests contrary to the public or members of other ethnoreligious backgrounds. Both left and right populism aim at a particular political and social homogeneity. The phenomenon of increased countries with developed democratic institutions and standards with authoritarianism leads to a closed circle

of global "legitimate-democratic" violence, in which democratic institutions and standards, human and minority rights, and freedoms will be in danger. The Balkans' lessons in dealing with similar individuals and movements that promote the "cleansing" of Europe and preserving an "identity" artificially tailored to others' hatred are proactivity. The Balkans' (un)-successful fight against the historical forms of right-wing extremism in more current circumstances has become like an overflowing foundation of global right-wing networks. Humankind's great concern stems from the increasingly aggressive foreign policy, xenophobic sentiment, and the growing inclination of the autocratic populist government to stop the transition of violence to democracy in the scientifically-technologically and culturally-spiritually objectively connected global community. Solutions based on opportunism and manipulation do not offer anything concrete that could improve the socio-political-security-economic situation. When a liberal sees that certain elements use coercion to regulate social relations according to their desire, to force the whole of society on acceptable socio-economic behaviour, the liberal should feel a personal responsibility to stand up for freedom. (Hadzic, 2020)

There are also some radical left parties with inclusionary populism in Europe, e.g., Greece. In Greece, inclusionary populism, whether led by Andreas Papandreou's PASOK or Tsipras' Syriza, has dominated the populist political landscape since the fall of the Greek dictatorship. Greece was not a colony of a powerful Western European country, but it has always been economically and culturally dependent on the West. As a result, this shadowy dependence on the West (that we can call crypto-colonialism) might explain the dominance of an anti-imperialist discourse and an inclusionary populism flourishing among the 'lower orders' of Greek politics. Syriza's populism in opposition indeed managed to improve the quality of democracy through its struggles against a neoliberal and technocratic EU. The radical left party became Greece's most important political movement and the "voice" of the marginalised people (the silent majority). However, SYRIZA's inclusive populist promise for a different Europe – beyond austerity policies and neoliberalism – and for the radical transformation of the political and economic system is still in limbo. (Markou, 2016)

In some post-socialist European countries, neoliberal democracy is hindered by the exposed or conditioned ethnic symbolic radical populism, particularly in the post-Yugoslav ethnonationalism political behaviour. Moreover, the approach towards the fascist ideology symbols disregards the communist social memory of stability and human security and a collectivism-oriented community. Neoliberal globalisation has strengthened national identities, supported by the war-related creation of ethnic homogenous territories. Consequently, former Yugoslavia's historical conflicting memory cultures from WW2 to the Yugoslav wars present enduring processes within sociopolitical ethnic-religious traditions. The collective historical and social memory that forms people's identities is manipulated, falsified, reduced, and politically instrumentalised. Contemporary ethnic-symbolic politics communicate through conservative political orientations: re-traditionalism behaviour (including some left-

wingers) advocates public acceptance. Historical anti-fascism actors have been stigmatised within attitudes toward the fascist ideology symbolism and traditional Balkan sociopolitical mythologies. Frequent use of (often) antagonistic ethnic symbolism in textual, rhetorical and visual forms expresses it. Various methods of conducting historical revisionism in the symbolic and ideological vocations decreased Yugoslavia's social memory. Institutional and non-institutional engagement is normatively needed in a battle for correct memory. Citizens' participation in political decision-making outside the ethnoreligious paradigm is crucial. The consequence of populist political orders in ethnoreligious partitioned post-socialism is ethnic-symbolic collectivism. It oppresses individual identity and excludes the possibility of distinct classification. Adapted to modern society, contemporary notions of autonomy and mind provide a theoretical framework for formulating political strategies in a post-national context. Acquisitive components of civil society and the society's stagnation due to slow consolidation can abruptly transform into political apathy motivating violent disorder. Accordingly, many sociopolitical realities symbolise and indicate that "democratised" post-socialist and post-Yugoslav states are more "inadequate" and "ineffective" than Yugoslavia. (Hadzic, 2023) "In Bosnia and Herzegovina's (B&H) recent elections, voters put on their Seven-League Boots twice over. Not only did they elect the leftists to the state presidency, but women candidates dominated the October election day. This really should not be seen as a laughing matter because the new members of the Presidency of B&H are Ms Željka Cvijanović from the SNSD, Mr Denis Bećirović from the SDP, and Mr Željko Komšić, from the Democratic Front. However, there certainly is wry amusement to be found in the track record of the SNSD, the party owned by Mr Milorad Dodik. In post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina, since this party set about developing its absolutism over ten years, it has renounced its leftist outlook and turned to nationalism. This nationalist stance has provided a political banner to obscure and hide all kinds of criminal activities to cover up the mismanagement of public resources and widespread nepotism. (Selimbegovic, 2022)

Thus, populism, right or left, in B&H goes in line with a defensive mechanism to retain power regarding systemic corruption. According to the 2023 Corruption Perception Index, B&H is the worst in South SouthEast Europe and is entirely devastated by corruption – the situation is worsening. B&H once again fell behind in this year's survey of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) published by Transparency International (TI) and ranks by far the lowest in the region and third worst in Europe when it comes to the state of corruption in the country. Only Russia and Ukraine achieved a result worse than B&H, which, with a score of 34 on a scale of 0 to 100, is among the countries where corruption is worsening the most. While numerous countries in the region are moving forward, B&H has fallen as many as eight index points since 2012 and, along with Turkey, in this year's TI global report, was singled out as an example of the most significant decline compared to 2012 in the region of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. B&H records the worst trend of all surrounding

countries, which is best illustrated by the example of Kosovo, which, from 2012 to 2022, progressed from a score of 34 to 41 index points, while in the same ten years, B&H fell from 45 to 34 points. In the key findings for the region of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, it is stated that the Western Balkans countries cannot suppress organised crime due to the deterioration of the rule of law and a captive judiciary. (Transparency International, 2023)

In B&H, the phenomenon is that the most radical party is a socialist-democratic party in the name and centre-left position, as in the case of the SNSD. SNSD has been the leading party of the B&H Serbs for several decades. The Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (Savez nezavisnih socijaldemokrata; SNSD) is the centre left-wing party but simultaneously extremely radical right-wing. Its leader, Milorad Dodik, a close ally of Hungarian right-wing President Victor Orban, has been on the USA blocklist and sanctioned for many years. The SNSD's first real electoral success was recorded in 2006, when it won 41 of the 83 seats in the National Assembly of Republika Srpska, attracting 44.95% of the popular vote. Since then, the party has gradually abandoned its reformist ideology for a more aggressive advocacy of Serbian nationalism, threatening the secession of Republika Srpska from the rest of B&H numerous times. The party was expelled from the Socialist International in 2012 for continuing to "espouse a nationalist and extremist" line. (Jukic, 2012) "Milorad Dodik has regularly been calling Bosniaks "Muslims" in Balkan media, including the speech at the European (EU) Parliament (2022). Does Dodik want to articulate that Bosniaks are not a people like Serbs and Croats but a religious group? According to Dodik, the Serbian people cannot be represented by a Serb married to a Muslim. Whether Dodik is courting the "European right" with such rhetoric from Islamic threat and capitalising on global Islamophobia? Mainly because of the ethnoreligious antagonism in B&H and Western Balkans. During the inauguration ceremony in 2022, Hungarian president Orban referred to a conspiracy theory popularised by the far right. "This program wants to replace "Christian children" who are on the way to disappearing with Muslim migrants from other civilisations. Dodik stated to numerous media: "The migrant crisis is a civilisational occupation of Christianity, and B&H has been offered as a refugee parking lot. We in B&H have a serious problem. They do not see it in (Muslim) Sarajevo. Our people are afraid of migrants." Thus, he aims to benefit from the right-wing policies and growing radical populism in Europe that is anti-immigrant and anti-Islam. Dodik undoubtedly follows these sociopolitical and ideological matrices. His politics are proximate to political networks (i.e., Hungarian Viktor Orban and French far-right politician Thierry Mariani). "Is the cosmopolitan European republic closer to the horizon of human desires? Or Orban's and Zemmour's replica of the Third Reich? (...) However, in post-war and highly fragile B&H, jingoism and ethnoreligious nationalism persisted, creating "three" prospective antagonistic collectivities generated by three (Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs) ethnopolitics. (Hadzic, 2022)

Populism and nationalism are often combined. Scholars give numerous reasons for the rise of nationalism and populism in society. The general population of the Balkans region are susceptible to the negative connotations of both populism and nationalism. Whenever we talk about conflict, especially genocides, the Holocaust has become synonymous with it. One of the most disturbing questions that has over the years arisen while studying the Holocaust is how the common public became a part of such an evil objective. A very similar issue arises in the case of Balkan as well. It is genocidal (historically) and post-genocidal region (latest wars). Only a couple of decades ago, this region witnessed fear and fighting that sabotaged their peace and harmony for years. These happenings nearly resulted in questioning (and still do: the latest, most dangerous political crisis in 2022) of B&H's existence as a country.

Due to its democratic stagnation, political and economic crises, and the exodus of the population, especially the young, the Western Balkans are fertile ground for populist rhetoric, for example, in Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Populism is a massive challenge for all the countries of the Western Balkans. It does not help that populist movements are growing across Europe and the world. What is clear is that the populists benefit the most from what is currently happening, and the citizens of the countries where the populists rule have the most minor benefit. Some of these leaders have been active for more than ten years, which shows the continuity of populism. So far, the only certainty that can help reduce populism relates to building strong institutions. However, the question is whether it is possible to do that, understanding that there is a need for more EU support, i.e., EU integration is long ahead. Populists are taking advantage of the current situation and continue to strengthen while preventing the development of sound institutions – all this leads to a vicious circle of populism in the Western Balkans. The only long-term solution is to speed up the EU integration process and ultimately integrate these countries into the EU. In the meantime, it is also possible to work on trying to build regional institutions through the Open Balkans initiative or upgrading the CEFTA agreement (Central European Free Trade Agreement). The goal is to reduce the influence of populism in Balkan politics and to emphasise those policies that contribute to concrete changes – primarily through increasing the living standards of the citizens of this region. For example, in a report entitled "Political Propaganda: All Serbs in a State: The Consequences of the Instrumentalization of the Media for Ultra-Nationalist Purposes", De la Brosse (2003) cites several reasons why the population of Serbia at the time was easy prey for nationalists:

- Disoriented population in the context of the general crisis (abandonment of the system of values and ideology of communism, difficult economic, political, and social situation, a lost population whose ideals have disappeared),
- Support for the regime by the leading creators of public opinion (such as "Politika", "Radio-Television of Serbia", the Orthodox Church),

State media is the primary source of information for 90% of the population (lack of independent media)

- Impossibility of democratic change of government (under the monopoly of state power in all spheres of social, political, and media life, the opposition had no chance to win the election)

- Absence of critical spirit. (Cavalic & Delic, 2022)

The non-existence of any alternative to the reality created by the government and the control of the media kept Slobodan Milošević and his ideology in power. As one of the soldiers of that ideology, at the end of the 1990s, Aleksandar Vučić appeared. He became the Minister of Information of Serbia in the government formed by Milošević's Socialist Party of Yugoslavia with the Serbian Radical Party of which he was a member. According to Kovačević (2020), this evident delay of Serbia in the process of democratisation is caused by various factors that are fertile ground for populists and their ideas, which in recent years, especially with the coming to power and strengthening of Aleksandar Vučić's policy, has become an integral part of political discourse in Serbia. The authors used Taggart's (2004) model, which explains the emergence of populism through clearly defined characteristics that need to be checked, emphasising that the following characteristics characterise populist movements, parties and individuals:

- Hostility towards representative democracy.
- The concept of serving the "fatherland" and the "people".
- Lack of fundamental values and principles and chameleon character.
- Spreading the atmosphere of extreme crisis.
- The vital role of the charismatic leader.

According to Salaj (2012), the central idea of populism is that society is divided into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: honest people and a corrupt elite. Populists emphasise the idea of good and honest people who have been deceived and manipulated by corrupt, incompetent, and interconnected elites. (Cavalic & Delic, 2023)

In recent years, several contributions have argued that right-wing populist voting is interrelated with individuals being negatively affected by globalisation. While there is merit to this argument, it cannot explain why voters unconcerned by globalisation vote for right-wing populist parties. The ontological insecurity or, the way we frame it, existential anxieties are a previously overlooked determinant of right-wing populist voting, as these anxieties make people vulnerable to right-wing populist crisis narratives even when they are not affected by the crises. Using European Social Survey data for 12 Western European countries between 2004 and 2018, Metten and Bayerlein (2023) constructed a novel index that measures existential anxieties on the

individual level. Their index shows (1) that existential anxieties increase the likelihood of right-wing populist voting and (2) that the fear fuelling narratives of these parties significantly mobilise individuals with moderate globalisation attitudes. (Metten & Bayerlein, 2023)

2) Latin America

In Latin America, populism is not restricted to political affiliation, social class, or origin. It has been a defining feature of Latin American politics for decades. From Argentina's Juan Perón to Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, charismatic leaders have mobilised their electoral base with fiery rhetoric, promises of economic prosperity, and appeals to the masses. However, while populism may have provided a path to power for these leaders, it has also contributed to a cycle of political instability, economic turmoil, and social unrest in the region. In recent years, the populist wave in Latin America has shown signs of receding. Left-wing populist movements, predominant in the early 2000s, have pushed back Brazil's Jair Bolsonaro and Colombia's Iván Duque. Others, like Argentina's Alberto Fernández, have taken a more moderate approach to governance. However, can this break in the populist cycle truly lead to long-lasting political stability and economic growth for Latin America? Many factors have contributed to the rise of populist leaders and movements in the region, and we have the consequences of their policies. The first wave of Latin American populism emerged in the 1940s and 1950s, with the rise of Juan Perón in Argentina and Getúlio Vargas in Brazil. They promoted policies favouring the working classes, such as wage increases, social security, and labour rights. However, they also centralised power, restricted civil liberties, and adopted protectionist economic policies. The second wave of Latin American populism emerged in the 1990s and 2000s in the wake of the debt crisis and the collapse of the Soviet Union. This wave was characterised by left-wing movements that challenged the neoliberal policies promoted by the US and international financial institutions like the World Bank and the IMF. Leaders such as Venezuela's Hugo Chávez (1999-2013), Bolivia's Evo Morales (2006-2019), and Ecuador's Rafael Correa (2007-2017) pursued policies of nationalisation, land reform, and social welfare programs that aimed to reduce poverty and inequality. While populist leaders succeeded in mobilising their supporters and implementing policies that addressed social inequalities, they equally contributed to the cycle of political instability, economic turmoil, and social unrest in Latin America. Populism contributes to social unrest and polarisation. Populist leaders often use divisive rhetoric that pits different groups against each other, such as the rich against the poor or the urban elites against the rural masses. It creates a climate of intolerance, social conflict, violence, economic instability, democratic erosion, and social polarisation, as elucidated above. Breaking the cycle of populism necessitates addressing its root causes and implementing concrete policy measures. (O Rayan, 2023) Left-wing populist forces in Latin America, such as those led by Morales in Bolivia and Kirchner in Argentina, have managed to fulfil many popular

demands and to create the conditions for a new "pluralistic" and more democratic society. (Markou, 2017)

Regarding populism and nationalism in Peronism and Chavism, despite their inclusionary policies, wealth redistribution, and the expansion of social and political rights, Perón and Chávez built authoritarian governments. These national populist leaders concentrated power in the executive, used laws instrumentally to repress dissent and used the state apparatus to colonise the public sphere and civil society. A combination of four factors explains their autocratic drift. First, the logic of populism transformed democratic rivals into enemies. Second, these leaders constructed the people as one and, once in power, enacted policies to transform diverse and pluralistic populations into homogeneous peoples embodied in their leaderships. Third, even though these former military officers promoted national sovereignty, they acted as the only interpreters of national interests, excluding rivals from the national community. Fourth, Perón and Chávez closed institutional spaces to process dissent and conflict, exacerbating the autocratic impulses of their opponents who used any means necessary, including military coups, to try to get rid of populist presidents. (De La Torre, 2017)

Strengthening democratic institutions by promoting transparency, accountability, and electoral participation can create resilient, democratic systems, enabling Latin America to withstand the populist pressure better. Implementing comprehensive electoral reforms – strictly regulating campaign finance, instituting monitoring mechanisms, investing in voter education programs, and strengthening the independence of electoral management bodies can pave the way for solid institutions. Promoting economic stability is significant to combat populism. Investing in infrastructure, fostering innovation, and supporting small and medium-sized enterprises are some policies that promote long-term economic growth. By creating a stable and prosperous economic environment, Latin America can reduce the appeal of populist promises and create a more sustainable path to prosperity. Policymakers must take steps to promote social inclusion and reduce inequality since populism often perpetuates in societies suffering from inequality and exclusion. According to the World Bank 2022 data, Latin America's average Gini coefficient stood at around 0.50, far from the global average of 0.39, indicating pronounced inequality challenges. Policies promoting education, healthcare, social welfare, diversity, tolerance, and multiculturalism can help create a more stable and harmonious society. Populism is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon posing significant challenges to Latin America's stability. Addressing the root causes and implementing policies to promote democratic institutions, economic stability, social inclusion, and regional cooperation can help the region break the cycle of populism and pave the way for a more stable and prosperous future. By working together and committing to the long-term goal of building a more resilient and inclusive society, Latin America can overcome the challenges of populism and build a brighter tomorrow. (O Rayan, 2023) I maintain that the politics in the postcolonialism conditions (Latin America) more often contain

populist populism interwoven with the effects of colonialism. It sees populism as a contemporary and collective political response to the global crisis of nation-state approaches due to globalisation and the stronghold of capitalism.

3) Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

Even before the conflict in Ukraine, the liberal state model looked much less attractive for the broader Middle East region than it had only a decade earlier, at the height of the Arab Spring. MENA (Middle East and North Africa) countries have had to resist political liberalism for a long time, shifting between exclusionary and inclusionary non-democratic states. After the failed Arab Spring, there are many challenges to inclusionary countries in the MENA countries. We have authoritarianism, the reality or threat of political violence, disputable human rights, gender inequality, and ongoing protest movements.

Populism in the Middle East has a relatively long history—for example, Iran, Turkey, and Israel. Moreover, as argued in the specific cases, the study of populism in the Middle East illuminates another sub-family: religious populism. A tension between inclusion and exclusion characterises religious populism since religion defines the boundaries of belonging, and as a consequence, it has a fundamental exclusionary dimension. While Ernesto Laclau considers the chain of equivalences as symbolical, the chapter finds three different dimensions around which populist movements are constituted: symbolical, distributive or material, and political. The Turkish and Israeli cases highlight the characteristics of populism in non-liberal (or semi-liberal) democracies and the exclusionary potential of populism in societies characterised by ethno-national conflicts. (Filc, 2018)

Although public opinion research has gained prominence in the Middle East and North Africa region since 2011, data on electoral behaviour and political attitudes are scarce and rarely have a comparative focus. In its 26-year history, no country other than Israel was ever part of the CSES from the Middle East and North Africa region—such datasets and how they contribute to a specific topic: understanding populism across multiple contexts. Tunisia is the first Arab country to be covered in the CSES. People who score high on the populist attitudes measures do not necessarily have a higher preference for populist parties or candidates. Contrary to consistent results from advanced industrial democracies, we also find that people who endorse nativism are more likely to support left-wing parties. (Mahrez et al, 2023)

In 2018, they featured critical parliamentary elections in Iraq and Lebanon. In both countries, formerly controversial populist figures performed far better than expected and are playing central roles in the scramble to form governments. In Iraq, the Saeroon coalition led by Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, the notorious former leader of the Mahdi Army militia, won the plurality of seats. In Lebanon, the Samir Geagea-led Lebanese Forces, a former militia traditionally seen as a right-wing Christian party, doubled its seats in parliament. At first glance, the two outliers, Sadr and Geagea, may

appear diametrical opposites, but their surprising victories reveal an emerging form of populism sweeping the Middle East. While Iraq and Lebanon are often compared for their ethnic and sectarian power-sharing agreements, these elections also show that ideology is the wrong lens to understand political nuance. Another feature of these populist movements is their attempt at internal reform.

Both leaders have made anti-corruption changes to their movements or state offices that their party members have held. For the 2018 elections, Sadr decided to run with a slate of new candidates, telling many of his seasoned political colleagues to step aside. He has also come down hard against members of his movement accused of corruption, including former deputy prime minister Baha Araj. In Lebanon, the protests led by independent civil society activists in 2015, sparked by a crisis about garbage collection, failed to cause governmental change as many protesters had hoped. Although many independents ran in the 2018 election, only one independent candidate won. Iraq's protest movement similarly failed to bring about systemic change. Only when the Sadrists joined did it offer glimpses of dramatic change. As a result, several prominent civil society activists decided to join forces with the Sadrist movement for the elections. Unlike the other elite who suffered from the turnout, Sadr's party of newcomer candidates maintained its electoral base. Geagea's party managed to snatch votes formerly given to establishing the Free Patriotic Movement. Their populist combination of elitism with a reform agenda appears to have given voters more confidence in the ability of Sadr and Geagea to implement reform than in the prospect of independent voices to change the system. (Mansour & Khatib, 2018)

The failures of Western efforts in Iraq, Libya, and above all in Afghanistan, where there had been the most significant international attempt to create a state that could combine local traditions and liberal ideals, contributed to this shift in sentiment. A plurality of other factors played a role, too. These include the political and economic crisis in Europe, which provoked the rise of populist movements; the tensions within the United States that erupted with the 2020 elections and the ensuing attack on the US Capitol on 6 January 2021; and the growing influence and popularity in the Middle East, of a China-like political model that appears to promise stability with economic growth at the expense of democratic values. Finally, the substantial failure of the Arab Spring, with the return of autocratic regimes or the outbreak of civil and proxy wars, further weakened the fading hopes of liberal movements in the region. For a long time, Tunisia had been seen as an exception in this geopolitical panorama.

Nevertheless, recent events have shown the fragility of the Tunisian democratic model and the deep contradictions in a post-2011 scenario. Against this background, the war in Ukraine has exacerbated international tensions, further polarising the "democracy vs autocracy" dichotomy. It has also highlighted Western contradictions and the differential attention the West pays to Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Therefore, limited Middle Eastern support for the West's positions in what appears to be simply a "European war" is understandable; in a multipolar context, regional

powers are trying to navigate between two competing blocs. Above all, the West's concentrated attention to the war in Ukraine has left local actors in other regions ample room to manoeuvre boldly, as demonstrated by the recent moves made by Tunisian President Kais Saied. Saied's 2019 election as president of Tunisia represented the victory of an anti-system, anti-elite rhetoric used by the candidate throughout his electoral campaign. His project was presented more like a messianic mission than a political or party agenda, had a simple set of slogans: "Purge" the country of the old political party system that had ruled Tunisia since the 1980s and is accused of being corrupt, elite-oriented and representative of feckless governance. Saied promised to erase the gap between citizens and decision-makers by reversing the power pyramid through an institutional reform inspired by a vague, populist concept of sovereignty. The idea was to give more power to local representatives and himself as a guarantor of the interests of the people and the nation. However, to "correct the revolutionary process", a phrase that the post-2011 revolts' regimes had sinisterly used. The principal scapegoat of Saied's rhetoric was the Islamist party Ennahda, guilty of failing to solve Tunisia's social and economic problems despite holding the most significant number of parliamentary seats for much of the decade after the 2011 uprising. However, the other parties were also in the dock, accused of not being able to create a stable economy and credible institutions. The economic and health consequences of COVID-19 pushed the country to the brink of collapse, leading the president to implement his project quickly. On 25 July 2021, with the support of the military and security forces, Saied declared a state of emergency, suspended parliament, and dismissed the prime minister. Parliament was later dissolved on 30 March 2022, when the effects of the current war in Ukraine had compounded Tunisia's crisis. (Melcangi, 2022)

Often named the only Middle Eastern Democracy, Israel is largely overlooked in the literature. However, it provides a rare example of what an entire decade of twenty-first-century populism in power looks like. Based on an examination of rhetoric and policymaking between 2009 and 2019, this article brings the writing on the subject up to date and highlights the unique traits of Israeli populism. In so doing, it establishes that Israeli populism has been mainstreamed remarkably and currently encompasses almost all right-wing parties in the country's legislature. Moreover, it shows that the Israeli case embodies a variety of populism which has yet to be acknowledged in the literature – neither economic nor cultural, but rather based on national security issues. The concept of 'security-driven populism', introduced here, could be helpful to researchers studying other populist regimes that do not fit neatly into the 'culture versus economy' debate, which has dominated the field for years. (Levi & Agmon, 2020) Such populism, by its character, is, of course, exclusionary towards Palestinians. However, Israeli democracy is under unprecedented attack from within. The radical right-wing government of Benjamin Netanyahu applies the recipes of authoritarian regimes similar to Hungary, Poland and other forms of

illiberal states. The issue in Israel is the goal of subjecting the judiciary and independent media to state control in the name of the people.

Populism can be considered a political communication technique or an ideology, a phenomenon by which politicians can mobilise people through rhetoric capable of triggering powerful collective emotions and stressing the gap between "us" and "them". In the Israeli political arena, the dynamic of populism is very interesting to analyse because the society is fragmented, polarised and divided by "cross-cutting cleavages" (such as ethnicity, religion and ideology), which can determine voters' political affiliation. Israeli political discourse has always relied on strategies that would have been able to conquer the most profound emotions of affiliated voters, shaping the public debate in a way that could reinforce strong voting patterns and the existence of two opposite ideological camps: the Left, led by Labor Party and the Right, headed by the Likud. While populism in Europe is linked both to the economic crisis and identity concerns regarding immigration within the Israeli arena, it seems to be related chiefly (if not only) to the identity dimension of the political discourse and, therefore, ultimately, to the ongoing conflict with the Palestinians. Thus, Anna Bargaini (2019) analysed the case of today's populism in Israel (it does not matter if it is conceived as a strategy or an ideology. As a phenomenon, populism originated from the right-wing narrative that peace is unattainable; indeed, rightist coalitions have dominated Israeli politics in the last 20 years since the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995: this significant event not only started the decline of the Oslo process but also paralysed the Left which has not been able to formulate a new viable alternative regarding the solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, giving to the nationalist camp the occasion to impose its view in the formulation of the security agenda. Of course, during these years of the Netanyahu era, the discourse adopted by the prime minister and his government has been radicalizing on many issues and has been increasing populist attitudes regarding, for example, the judicial system, the media and the police, but the rule of right wing-populism has stemmed from the overtaking of Left's traditional dominance in the security discourse. That element proved to be so fundamental because the Territories/Peace Issue is not only a political debate but involves deep collective emotions linked to the very definition of Israeli identity; this delineation polarises the electorate, showing that the "peace camp" and the "nationalist camp" are more than simple expressions of two different political opinions, but are instead powerful, opposite concepts regarding the nature of the State itself (Medinat Yisrael, envisioned by the Left, or Eretz Yisrael, supported by the Right). The rightward shift of the Israeli political arena, together with its values, can be re-balanced proposing an alternative to the positions given by the government coalition on the most crucial issues to the voters: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, from which the electorate derives the anxieties and the polarisation that fuel populist dynamics in Israel. (Bargaini, 2019)

A new form of Islamic populism has evolved in many parts of the Muslim world. Its emergence is part of the universal phenomenon of populist responses to the

contradictions of globalised capitalism. It is also a consequence of the outcomes of Cold War-era social conflicts and social-structural transformations in Muslim societies over the last half-century. Specifically, it articulates the rising ambitions and growing frustrations of urban middle classes across the Muslim world, the anxieties of growing urban poor populations and relatively peripheralised sections of the bourgeoisie. Thus, representing cross-class coalitions, the New Islamic Populism aims to provide access to power and tangible resources to an ummah conceived to be both downtrodden and homogeneous, though, in actuality, increasingly differentiated. This is evident in Indonesia (not MENA), Egypt and Turkey. (Hadiz, 2014)

Central to understanding political Islam and light on populist forms of politics beyond Western democracies is the exploration of whether this recent tide of Islamic populism (Egypt, Turkey, and Indonesia) acts as a corrective that empowers the people or as a threat that capitalises on the ill-informed masses to garner support for charismatic leaders. The cases under scrutiny demonstrate that by weakening the authoritarian structures, producing doctrinally flexible politicians, and incorporating marginalised groups into politics, this new form of populism facilitates democratic transitions in authoritarian and competitive severe settings. However, the very characteristics of populism that prove successful against the establishment also create significant impediments to democratic consolidation later on. By rejecting plurality and failing to re-establish the formal and informal institutions necessary for democratic governance, these movements often replace one form of authoritarianism with another. Broken promises of inclusion leave a bitter legacy of populism in the political arena, making citizens much more cynical about political processes in the long run. (Oztas, 2020)

Populism and misogyny very often silence women journalists in the Middle East and North Africa. Thirty per cent of the women journalists in MENA surveyed by the International Center for Journalists (ICFJ) answered that they self-censor on social media. In another ICFJ survey, 20 per cent of female journalists said they withdrew from all online interaction due to harassment and threats. (Erhain, 2023)

The conflict between Hamas and Israel reveals deep divisions within and among EU member states. These tensions are fueling both anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. If the Russian invasion of Ukraine cemented a unity in European foreign policy that has taken more than a year to show cracks, the escalation of violence between Hamas and Israel needed only a few days to expose the geopolitical fragility of the union. Struggling to have a common position, the hard-to-get consensus for a "humanitarian pause" proves the deep divisions among member states. This crisis has aggravated the fracture lines between the West and the Global South and between the EU and its southern neighbourhood. The EU today is a secondary player in a diplomatic framework that has failed in the region. Europe is vulnerable to what happens in the Middle East, Ukraine, and China. And to the planet's climate change challenges.

Moreover, we have NATO matters and Donald Trump's potential presidential return to the White House. EU unity appears to be part of the collateral damage of the terrorist attack on Hamas. The cacophony of European messages following October 7 showed not only a deplorable failure of coordination among EU officials. It also brought to the surface the long-standing divisions between the member states that support Israel unconditionally and others that feel equal sympathy for the suffering of the Palestinians. However, this reminder of the EU's limitations as a geopolitical actor is probably one of these tragic events' less harmful consequences for Europe. Much more severe are the potential repercussions at the societal level. If the turmoil in the Middle East continues and spreads, it will turbo-charge the polarisation already affecting many parts of Europe. Both anti-Semitism and Islamophobia will surge. The threat of terrorism and other forms of violence will increase. Attitudes toward migration will harden further and create new obstacles to the integration of ethnic and religious minorities. Radical right parties will exploit the situation, and their nationalist agenda will impede the finding of European solutions. Realistically, the EU's ability to majorly contribute to managing this crisis is modest. Still, it must do whatever it can because the stakes for European societies and politics could not be higher. (Dempsey, 2023) Moreover, as a complex Region, MENA involves countries with (semi) democratic or authoritarian regimes and between parliamentary or presidential systems. Yet, alongside the politics of populism (including geopolitical aspirational frictions, e.g., EU, USA, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel), MENA retains internal political and military conflicts and external interventions.

4) Comparative Perspective

The contemporary populists in both Europe and Latin America have made important innovations. The European populist radical right's emphasis on excluding Muslims is relatively recent and strongly related to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In contrast, the emphasis on including the indigenous population is a relatively new development within Latin American populism. Latin-American populism is mostly inclusive, and European populism is mostly exclusionary. Moreover, colonialism is an essential key to understanding the development of either form of populism. Following a characterisation of populism and the links between colonialism and the conceptualisation of the people, Filc (2015) analysed Peronism and Le Pen's Front National as case studies to support its claim. Among the most representative—and most studied—examples of Latin-American populism, Peronism has remained a significant force for almost 70 years. Le Pen's movement is among the first and most important European radical right populist movements. Thus, those crucial cases are part of a much broader picture in which the role within the colonial relationship shapes the development of either exclusionary or inclusive populism. (Filc, 2015)

While populism is a hotly debated topic worldwide, most scholarship suffers from conceptual confusion and regional singularity. Mude and Kaltwasser (2011) compared European and Latin American populism, based on a clear minimum

definition, along three dimensions that dominate the scholarly literature: 1) economy vs. identity, 2) left-wing vs. rightwing, and 3) inclusion vs. exclusion. Empirically, their particular focus was on four prototypical cases of the predominant type of populism in these regions in the 1990–2010 period: Jörg Haider and the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Austrian Freedom Party, FPÖ) and Jean-Marie Le Pen of the French Front National (National Front, FN) in Europe, and Bolivian President Evo Morales and his Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement for Socialism, MAS) and Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and his Movimiento V [Quinta] República (Fifth Republic Movement, MVR) in Latin America. Their findings confirm some generally held beliefs and challenge and clarify others. Among the more notable conclusions are:

Populism in Latin America is more ethnic than populism in Europe;

The difference between "rightwing" populists in Europe and "left-wing" populists in Latin America is mainly a consequence of their affiliated ideologies, not their populism;

In material, political, and symbolic terms, European populism is primarily exclusionary, while Latin American populism is predominantly inclusionary and

Populism is more important in Latin America than Europe in electoral, political, and ideological terms. (Mude and Kaltwasser, 2011)

Whether populism is inclusive or exclusive is at the core of much research and has led to strongly opposing conclusions. Given that the existing studies tend to use highly diverse definitions of populism and are regionally specific, we analysed the question by employing a single definition, a cross-regional perspective and a clear framework for exclusion/inclusion. Our analysis of the FN/Le Pen and the FPÖ/Haider vis-à-vis the PSUV/Chávez and the MAS/Morales shows that both aspects are present in all cases (see also Canovan Reference Canovan1999), but that in material, political and symbolic terms European populists can be labelled primarily as exclusionary. At the same time, Latin American populism is predominantly inclusionary. Moreover, Latin American populism predominantly has a socioeconomic dimension (including low-income people), while European populism has a primarily sociocultural dimension (excluding the 'aliens'). It can be partially explained by the different socioeconomic situations in the two regions. Following Ronald Inglehart (1977), Europe has reached a level of development where post-material politics are at least rivalling socioeconomic politics for importance. At the same time, Latin America is still a long way from this 'silent revolution' because of the continuing high levels of socioeconomic disparity and poverty. In this sense, the European populist radical right is a modern phenomenon, an example of the new politics that emerged due to the 'silent revolution'. While identity politics is usually associated exclusively with 'left-wing' or 'progressive' political actors such as the new social movements or the Green parties, the European populist radical right is a post-material phenomenon based first and foremost on identity rather than (material) interest. As some scholars

have recently demonstrated, Western Europe is experiencing the emergence of a new political cleavage primarily centring on cultural issues and transforming the party system in many region countries. In contrast, while identity does play a role in contemporary Latin American populist movements, overall, they are still primarily involved in materialist politics. Indeed, most Latin American countries have seen the formation of left-of-centre governments in recent years. Part of the explanation for this 'turn to the left' lies in the failure of the policies of the Washington Consensus to tackle the levels of inequality in the region, allowing leftist forces to develop a successful political platform centred on the socioeconomic realm in general and material redistribution in particular (Levitsky & Roberts, 2011)

The comparison of Latin American and European populism helps us further demonstrate that populism hardly ever emerges in a pure form. Consequently, populism is almost always attached to other ideological features related to particular grievances in different regional contexts. In the highly unequal Latin American world, this is predominantly Americanismo; in the post-material European world, it is mainly nativism. Whereas the former is a discourse that emphasises anti-imperialism and supposes a fraternal identity between the inhabitants of Latin America, the latter is a xenophobic version of nationalism, according to which the state should be inhabited only by members of the native group and non-native (alien) people and values are perceived as threatening to the nation-state. The associated ideological features partly explain why European populists are predominantly exclusive and Latin American populists chiefly inclusive. While the difference between a Latin American inclusionary populism and a European exclusionary populism has held at least since the 1990s, it is essential to note that in both regions, the conception of the groups that should be excluded from and included in society has varied over time. In this regard, the contemporary populists in Europe and Latin America have made important innovations. The European populist radical right's emphasis on excluding Muslims is relatively recent and strongly related to the terrorist attacks 9/11. In contrast, the emphasis on including the indigenous population is a relatively new development within Latin American populism. By arguing that European populism is predominantly exclusionary and Latin American populism is primarily inclusionary, we are not claiming that the former inevitably hurts democracy. At the same time, the latter exclusively embodies a positive force for democracy. We should be cautious about making normative judgements about populism since the latter can be both a threat to and a corrective for democracy. For instance, populist actors and parties usually give voice to groups that do not feel represented by the elites and obligate them to react and change the political agenda to include these marginalised voices. Nevertheless, populist forces might also refer to the idea of popular sovereignty to dismantle the checks and balances inherent to liberal democracy. In other words, the re-politicization of society fostered by all populist forces has an ambivalent impact on democracy. (Mude & Kaltwasser, 2011)

Regarding the Middle East and the possibility of comparison with European and Latin American populism (for example, Turkey), there has yet to be a consensus on categorising the Justice and Development Party (AKP). However, the lack of consensus is due to a selective focus on the attributes of AKP's populism. Indeed, when the party's features are examined holistically, it does not neatly conform to the dominant typologies of populism, which were primarily conceived for European and Latin American examples. For historical reasons, AKP's populist discourse defines "the people" versus "the elite" in civilisational terms and combines this with strategies of neo-liberalism, strong party organisation and grassroots mobilisation. This blend of populism distinguishes the AKP case from the exclusionary/inclusionary and classical/neo-liberal/radical typologies previously identified by the literature. (Gursoy, 2021)

Conclusion

Various facts suggest that populism differs. Some are tasks of regeneration or democratisation; others are movements that would weaken democracy by promoting the rebirth of nationalism and politics of exclusion (fascism, xenophobia, racism, radical nationalism). Thus, the former is left-wing populism, while the latter is right-wing populism.

Accordingly, the facts are the rise of exclusionary radical populism in Europe and inclusionary populism in Latin America. Regardless, some exceptions exist, including inclusionary radical left populism (e.g. Greece, or exclusionary left-wing populism (e.g. B&H, social-democratic by name and by position centre simultaneously left-wing and right-wing). Concerning MENA, as a complex Region, the Region involves countries with (semi) democratic or authoritarian regimes and between parliamentary or presidential systems. However, alongside the politics of populism (including geopolitically), MENA retains internal political and military conflicts and external interventions. MENA populism processes are broader and part of a complex global geopolitical context. Populism, be it right-wing or left-wing, and its inclusionary and exclusionary politics also treats international and regional human security, human rights and development, particularly in Africa, South East Europe, Latin America and the Middle East. Even before the conflict in Ukraine, the liberal state model looked much less attractive for the broader Middle East region than it had only a decade earlier, at the height of the Arab Spring. Also, the failure of Western interventions - Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria has affected populism politics. Populism processes in MENA, a region within (semi) democratic or authoritarian regimes, between parliamentary or presidential systems and enforced by external geopolitical agents and aspirations, are broader and part of a complex global geopolitical context. However, alongside the politics of populism (including geopolitically), MENA retains internal political and military conflicts and external interventions. In MENA, populism varies between right-wing and left-wing, with a category of security populism in Israel and Islamic Populism in much of the Islamic

world. The politics in the postcolonialism conditions (Latin America) more often contain populism. It sees populism as a contemporary and collective political response to the global crisis of nation-state approaches due to globalisation and the stronghold of capitalism.

There is a strong possibility that far-right parties (particularly in Europe) will broaden their voter base and create coalitions due to several global issues, such as continuous migrations, islamophobia or new views of anti-semitism mainly due to the current state of war between Israel and Palestine. Consequently, in the MENA, we can expect political populist changes locally, regionally, and internationally. The world is becoming increasingly characterised by populism, inclusionary or exclusionary.

Common sense voting behaviour worldwide is under populist invasion, left and right-wing. The motivating force and practice of the populists are the (self-proclaimed) protection of (ethnic) national identities, socio-cultural values, or religion. Populist often builds their programs on the suppression and denial of analytical facts and various exclusions (more nominal inclusions) by resurrecting the socio-political concepts and ideals of outdated nationwide sovereignty.

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Populism in an Age of Challenge, Change and Chaos from the Eyes of Educators

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Extended Abstract

Albert II of Belgium noted “In these troubled times we live in, we should remain vigilant and see through populist arguments. Thus, who makes the arguments, leads the populist movement, as well as impacts the populace? Further, who truly represents the people – the politicians, educators, leaders, scientists, or ordinary citizens. While the Populism Movement was formed in the late 1800s in the United States, it also appeared across the globe to address the needs and concerns of the people. However, one has to wonder when new ideologies, theories, and lines of thinking start to appear – they should remain in the same framework and offer the same to all people. However, some leaders and groups change or adjust certain ways of thinking or leadership to meet their needs instead.

The central theme of today’s speech is to look at how populism may have had changed its form in the context of what was meant as the “voice of the people” to perhaps to adjust to the self-serving fulfillment of needs for certain groups and/or populist leaders. Further, we will look at how there was a new “checks-and-balances” presented at the onset of the Covid-19 Pandemic that started to question the way some populist leaders might have led their citizens and the world astray to a different meaning or understanding of populism, but rather to help with their own “self-fulfilling prophecy”. Consequently, the health concerns of the Pandemic outbreak caused the people to start thinking more about their leaders and governments in terms of how they handled the health concerns in terms of the availability of services, status of their economy since many people could not go to their physical work environments due to the outbreak, except for the first responders (i.e., doctors, police, emergency personnel, etc.), and educating the children to keep some semblance of normalcy in this age of chaos. The key element then and now is education – what is the true role and function of business and educational leaders during any crisis, as well as the rising of leaders who may not be the “true voice of the people.”

Second, while global leaders tried to “capture the day and their own agenda”, the big downfall which became evident over time was the denial of science and prevention of services in many areas due to leadership and/or government intervention. The Council on Foreign Relations featured the writings of Mounk that provided another perspective that we should keep in mind. “In the first months of the pandemic, many observers argued that countries led by populist leaders who distrust science and deny the severity of the pandemic would suffer worse outcomes. Perhaps, they speculated,

it might even slow or reverse the seemingly inexorable rise that the populists have enjoyed over the past decade.” (Mounk, 2021). Further, in this presentation, we will look at populism during the three states of the Pandemic from the onset, during, and after phases. Populism changed in different ways over the past decades, and many who believed in it started to rethink their own beliefs and value systems. Let us keep in mind what the Dalai Lama wrote “Our prime purpose in this life is to help others. And if you can't help them, at least don't hurt them.” Consequently, Mounk (2021) stated that “the transition from Donald Trump to Joe Biden has shown how much a competent government can, even in the late stage of the game, do to improve the situation.” However, what did we learn during this period or discover from this outbreak that Trump stated in January 2020 would not kill anyone and no more than 15 people would get sick from Covid-19? It would not be until almost 2 years later with the loss of 1 million American lives and multi-million personal losses worldwide that people would start to question whether what we knew as populism may have changed. Mounk (2021) summed up this thought in the following quote: “The price of populism has turned out to be even more deadly than we could have imagined before this terrible pandemic swept the world.” However, we need to remember the words of William Shakespeare: “Some are born great, some achieve greatness, and some have greatness thrust upon them.” Therefore, a new book has opened for the fields of business and education to write this new genre of lessons learned and best practices that were gained from the Pandemic period and to be the “true voices for the people.”

Keywords: Populism, Age of Challenge, Change and Chaos, Educators

Dimensions of John Rawls's Philosophy on the Implications of Politics in the Interpretation of Law in Postmodern Societies

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Abstract

Destabilization of the development of postmodern societies; under the constant influence of the consequences of the pandemic, wars in the region and natural disasters (earthquakes, floods, etc.), has highlighted the need for reflections on issues of law and its legal regulations. In this perspective, a series of problems are presented that are addressed to the state institutionalization of the notion of law and state policies that are drawn up by the states, which maintain their sovereignty in decision-making related to these issues. Balkan states, such as Albania; countries that aspire to the continuous demand for democratic political-economic-social stability wander between the role and influence of politics in the drafting, interpretation and implementation of the law; in accordance or not with the notion of justice. Such cases are reflected in the contemporary philosophy of law, such as the theory of John Rawls. For this reason, this paper aims to highlight: the theoretical political-justice implications according to Rawls, the reflection of these implications in concrete realities such as the Albanian state and the positive and negative impacts of these implications in relation to concepts such as freedom, equality, constitutionality and human rights.

In order to deal adequately and coherently with the aforementioned issues, this study has referred to the qualitative research method, as a phenomenological study. For this purpose, primary sources of Rawls's theory, statistical and historical-political-legal sources have been studied; as well as secondary sources of interpretation of these problems.

Keywords: justice, politics, Rawls, implications, Albania

The story behind Black History Month and why it's celebrated in February: 2023 theme – Black Resistance

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Abstract

Every February, the U.S. honors the contributions and sacrifices of African Americans who have helped shape the nation. Black History Month celebrates the rich cultural heritage, triumphs and adversities that are an indelible part of our country's history. The month of February was chosen to coincide with the birthdays of Abraham Lincoln, the US president who issued the Emancipation Proclamation in 1863, and Frederick Douglass, an African American orator, social reformer, writer and abolitionist. The month-long celebration is a chance to acknowledge the historic achievements of Black Americans and to highlight their undeniable impact on American history. Game changers like Malcolm X, Rosa Parks and Martin Luther King, Jr. are some of the names we learn more about each February. But the celebration that is now Black History Month started long before these civil rights leaders made their mark. In 1915, historian Dr. Carter G. Woodson and minister Jesse E. Moorland founded the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History, now known as the Association for the Study of African American Life and History (ASALH). This group focused on researching the advancements made by people of African descent and, in 1926, sponsored the first Negro History Week. The current month-long observance began in 1926 as a week-long event sponsored by the Association for the Study of African American Life and History (ASALH). Since 1976, the month of February has been officially designated as Black History Month. The Black History Month 2023 theme, "Black Resistance," explores how African Americans have resisted historic and ongoing oppression, in all forms, especially the racial terrorism of lynching, racial pogroms and police killings since the nation's earliest days.

Keywords: African American history; Black History Month; Black Resistance.

The British Council's Overseas Educational Dynamism During the 1980s: A Promotion of British Influence

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Abstract

The “Education and Training” of overseas people is an important activity through which cultural agencies promote a positive image of their respective countries to serve the latter’s political and economic interests. As regards the British Council, what was performed during the 1980s- when both the British domestic and the world scenes knew turbulences that affected British interests overseas- in this field as a contribution to international scholarship was limited compared with the immensity of the educational domain and the considerable funds absorbed by scientific research, the arrangement of a sponsored visit by a Noble Laureate to Eastern Europe for example, can have an immeasurable impact which may lead Britain to draw benefits in the long-term. The same benefits could be earned in developing countries through the granting of awards, for instance, to overseas students and trainees.

Keywords: British Council, Overseas Dynamism, Education and Training, Promotion of Influence.

The Concept of Populism: Between the Aspirations of Opponents and the Manipulations of Authoritarian Regimes

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Abstract:

Many contemporary researchers differed in defining the concept of the term “populism” because of unclear concepts that this term carries. It is initially referred to a group of political positions that emphasize the idea of the people-the elite- then it later developed to include every political movement or party or leader. And since this term was used to express many phenomena, studies found that it was misused, and it no longer meant what could be expressed by the opponents or the ruling regimes. Therefore, the term populism has often been used by the press as a slogan to express modern political or social movements, rulers and institutions rooted in democratic beliefs, that is, by using it in a pejorative way to strengthen the reputation of the opponents. In fact, through this apparent inconsistency in defining the term populism, one can wonder if it cannot be considered as a double-edged sword, that is, by using it by the opposition elite when expressing their demands, and by the ruling regimes when expressing their repressive policies and rejecting the demands of the people.

Keywords: Populism, People, Positions, Parties, Movements, Elite, Democracy, Opposition, Ruling Regimes, Liberation, Oppression, Socialism

Populism in Digital Societies: Challenges for Digital Sociology

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Body:

Populism is a phenomenon that currently pervades the digital networks with a deep social and political visibility and consequent influence, being difficult to control in an increasingly digitalized world. Digital Sociology studies this phenomenon, among others, and can provide epistemologies, methodologies and analytical instruments that provide a better heuristic capacity in the comprehension of this phenomenon.

Keywords: digital societies, digital sociology, populism, preconceptions, biases representations

Sustainable Development and Social Economy; A New Paradigm or Mere Utopia?

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Abstract

The question whether economic development can be sustainable is nowadays of fundamental nature. Prior assumptions made by economy classics, such as *Adam Smith*, regarding the “invisible hand” – being the key to economic growth and harmonic development of the market and the whole society – seem nowadays insufficient. This is due to resource limitations, climate changes, global warming and threats to biodiversity. Growth can no longer be viewed as unlimited. More and more popular in the public debate (agenda), also within the European Union (the European Commission), becomes in recent years the concept of sustainable development, social economy and social (inclusive) entrepreneurship. Social economy organisations are entities with different legal forms (social enterprises, cooperatives, mutuals, associations, foundations) which put social and environmental purposes first (“people and planet first”), reinvesting most of their profit back to the organisation or a social cause and embracing participatory (inclusive) governance. The debate on sustainable development involves and affects also traditional forms of for-profit business; a benefit corporation or the concept of sustainable corporate governance being the perfect examples of this phenomenon.

Keywords: social economy, social enterprise, cooperative, benefit corporation, sustainable development, sustainable corporate governance.